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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction existed in the district court under Utah Code§ 78A-5-102(1). 
Appellate jurisdiction exists under Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2)Q). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE No. 1: Evidence not considered in the trial court cannot be considered on appeal. 
Chuck's standing argument relies entirely on evidence that the trial court deemed 
untimely and refused to consider. The court deemed the evidence untimely because it was 
available the day the lawsuit was filed but was not offered until six years after litigation 
began and nearly a year after trial. Can Chuck's standing argument prevail where there is · 
no evidence available to support it? 
Standard of Review for Issue No.1: Challenges to standing are reviewed using 
the standard for a dispositive motion at the relevant stage of litigation.1 In addition, 
factual findings that affect standing are reviewed for abuse of discretion, while legal 
determinations that affect standing are reviewed for correctness. 2 
Preservation: This argument was not preserved. While standing is a jurisdictional 
issue that cannot be waived, for all intents and purposes Chuck waived this particular 
standing argument by failing to timely offer evidence to support it. Evidence supporting 
this argument was not offered until nearly a year after trial and the trial court refused to 
consider it. 3 
ISSUE No. 2: The FSBO states that the Seller agrees to pay a commission if the Seller 
1 Brown v. Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14, ,r 15,228 P.3d 747. 
2 Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ,r 10, 154 P.3d 808 (internal citations omitted). 
3 See pp. 12-16, infra. 
accepts an offer from the Buyer. It is undisputed that the Seller accepted an offer from the 
Buyer. Did the trial court err in ruling that the Seller was obligated to pay a commission? 
Standard of Review for Issue No. 2: A district court's grant of summary 
judgment is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. 4 
Preservation: In his opening brief, Chuck asserts two arguments against summary 
judgment, but only one argument was preserved. First, Chuck argues that he was liable 
for a commission only if the sale was prevented by the Seller's default and that, as a 
matter of law, the Seller did not default.5 But none of Chuck's record cites indicate that 
Chuck made this argument opposing summary judgment. Thus this argument was not 
preserved. 
Chuck's second argument is that no commission was earned because the buyer did 
not meet the "ready, willing, and able" standard. This argument was preserved. 
ISSUE No. 3: The jury verdict finding Chuck personally liable may be overturned only if 
no evidence supports the verdict. Aspenwood's agent testified at trial that Chuck said he 
would pay the commission. In addition, the FSBO and REPC in this case name Chuck as 
the Seller, but do not name Still Standing as a contracting party and do not express that 
Chuck is acting on behalf of Still Standing. Is there evidence to support the jury's 
verdict? 
Standard of Review for Issue No. 3: A jury verdict may be disturbed only if the 
evidence so clearly favors the appellant that reasonable people would not differ on the 
4 Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias, 2013 UT 47, ,i 7, 321 P.3d 1021 (internal citation 
omitted). 
5 Br. of Appellant, pp. 43-47. 
2 
,c, 
-
outcome of the case.6 
Preservation: Chuck preserved the issue of his personal liability, but did not 
preserve the majority of the arguments made in his opening brief. When Chuck moved 
for summary judgment, he made three very specific and limited arguments: 
1) The FSBO states that the listed seller "represents all of the record owners 
of the Property." Still Standing owned the Property. Therefore Chuck 
was representing Still Standing as an agent. 7 
-2}- The REPC describes the Property as "Land LLC Still Standing Stables." 
This shows that Still Standing, not Chuck, is the seller. 8 
3) An agent can be personally liable for a contract only if the .agent clearly 
indicates that the liability was the agent's alone. Chuck did not clearly 
indicate that the liability was his alone. 9 
Chuck does not raise the first argument on appeal. He does raise the second and 
third argument, but also rais~s several additional arguments such as references to title 
searches 8:lld correspondence between the parties. These arguments were not raised when 
:.;; Chuck moved for summary judgment and they were not raised at trial. Thus these 
additional arguments were not preserved for appeal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Determinative provisions are set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
4J 6 Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2013 UT App 226, 1 7, 311 P .3d 564. 
7 R. at 1424. 
8 Id. 
9 R. at 1424-25. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises out of a real estate brokerage's attempt to colleGt a commission. 
The real estate brokerage consists of Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation, Elite Legacy 
Corporation, and their principal broker Skip Wing (this brief refers to these parties 
collectively as Aspenwood or the Aspenwood Plaintiffs). Aspenwood alleged that it 
entered into a For-Sale-By-Owner Commission Agreement with the defendants Still 
Standing Stable, LC, Chuck Schvaneveldt, and Cathy Code, and that Aspenwood earned 
a commission under that FSBO agreement. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
The course of proceedings is long and complicated. This summary attempts to 
include only the proceedings relevant to this appeal. 
In November, 2006, "Remax Elite" (a dba designation) filed a petition seeking 
declaratory relief regarding whether Remax Elite should deliver earnest money to the 
buyer or the seller after a failed real estate transaction. 10 Later Remax Elite asserted a 
claim against Still Standing, Chuck, and Cathy claiming that Remax had earned a 
commission by bringing an offer that the seller accepted. 11 The defendants tenaciously 
opposed Remax's capacity to sue them, claiming in at least nine pretrial motions that 
"Remax Elite," as nothing more than a dba designation, did not have standing to sue. 12 
10 R. at 1-4. 
11 R. at 660-64. 
12 R.at1166-96; 1256-83; 1407-62;2068-104;2120-36;2390-414;2548-53;2614-
22; 2653-60. 
4 
,..;,, 
Specifically, the defendants argued that only Remax Elite's principal broker Skip Wing 
could sue to recover the commission. 13 At one point, Chuck even submitte_d a summary 
judgment motion asserting as undisputed fact that Skip Wing was Remax Elite's principal 
broker and the only principal broker involved in the transaction. 14 
Eventually these motions were resolved by adding the Aspenwood plaintiffs (i.e., 
Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation, Elite Legacy Corporation, and their principal broker 
Skip Wing).1~ After Aspenwood was added, the defendants abandoned these standing · 
arguments. 16 
In the meantime, Aspenwood moved for summary judgment on all claims against 
it. 17 These claims included tort claims based on alleged misconduct by Tim Shea, 
_;, Aspenwood's real estate agent involved i:1;1 the transaction. 18 Aspenwood argued that the 
tort claims failed because Still Standing could not establish causation.19 Specifically, 
Aspenwood argued that the transaction failed because the Seller refused to provide a 
general warranty deed as required by the REPC. 20 
The trial court agreed with Aspenwood and clearly understood that the Seller's 
failure to provide a general warranty deed was critical: "[I]sn't it the prerogative of a 
buyer to spurn a special warranty deed if he feels insecure and say the only condition to 
13 Id. 
14 R. at 1408. 
15 R. at 3591-604. 
16 R. at 7015 . 
.iJ 17 R. at 2887-89. 
18 R. at 842-49. 
19 R. at 2920-23. 
20 R. at 2913-16; 2922; 8389, pp. 8:4-7, 15:7-19. 
5 
purchasing this is a general warranty deed? Isn't that his right?"21 
Chuck ignores this in his opening brief. He correctly points out that the trial court 
stated that the deal failed solely because of a lack of insurable access. But it was always 
understood that the lack of access killed the deal because the lack of access prevented the 
Seller from delivering a general warranty deed: 
.. '~· -·· ., ... 
[I]t is undisputed that the lack of a guaranteed access was the sole 
reason ... that the transaction failed .... [I]t strains credulity to think that 
somebody would fork over four million without a general.warranty deed or 
at least some kind of a guarantee under a special warranty deed that there 
would be an access. 22 
This understanding of why the deal failed is bolstered by Tim Shea's trial testimony that 
the Buyer would have bought the Property if Chuck had provided a general warranty 
deed.23 
After the trial court dismissed the claims against Aspenwood, all that remained 
was Aspenwood's commission claim against Still Standing, Chuck, and Cathy. Chuck 
attempted to avoid liability on the commission claim by moving for summary judgment.24 
He claimed that he could not be liable for the commission because he was involved in the 
deal only as Still Standing's representative.25 Chuck also argued that because the REPC 
describes the Property as "Land LLC Still Standing Stables" Chuck was entitled to 
judgment as a matter oflaw that he was not personally liable.26 The court denied this 
21 R. at 8389, p. 21:13-16. 
22 R. at 8389, p. 53:1-7. 
23 R. at 8385, p. 136:2-19. 
24 R. at 1407-11. 
25 R. at 1424-25. 
26 Id. 
6 
.-~ \$1 
motion, stating that the fact the FSBO identifies Chuck as the seller, without indicating 
that he was acting in a representative capacity, sufficed to overcome Chuck's motion.27 
Aspenwood eventually prevailed on the commission claim through a combination 
of partial summary judgment and a jury verdict. Aspenwood's motion for partial 
summary judgment asked the court to rule as a matter of law that a commission had been 
earned.28 The motion did not address which defendant would be liable to pay the 
commission, reserving that issue for a later motion or for trial.29 .,::.,.:· 
In supporting the motion, Aspenwood provided an affidavit from the Buyer and an 
affidavit from the Buyer's lender demonstrating that the Buyer had secured the necessary 
funding to purchase the Property and was ready to proceed with the deal.3° Chuck did not 
.J> offer any evidence to refute the suggestion that the Buyer had obtained the necessary 
financing and was ready to proceed with the deal.31 Instead, Chuck argued that he never 
accepted an offer because he believed that the transaction would be a cash transaction.32 
The trial court rejected this argument for three reasons: I) the REPC integrated all prior 
discussions into a final, written agreement and the REPC states that the transaction would 
.;;; be financed;33 2) the source of financing was irrelevant to Chuck and Chuck had offered 
no evidence that the Buyer would not have obtained financing;34 and 3) the argument 
27 R. at I 890. 
28 R. at 1511-12. 
29 Id. 
30 R. at 1547-97. 
-iii 31 R. at 3658. 
32 R. at 8382, pp. 31:20-33:8. 
33 R. at 8382, p. 28: 10-22. 
34 R. at 8382, pp. 29:8-32:4. 
7 
relied on claims of fraud, which Chuck waived by not pleading fraud as a defense.35 
In the end, the trial court granted Aspenwood's motion, reasoning that under the 
plain language of the FSBO Aspenwood had done everything it needed to do to earn a 
commission.36 The court (correctly) did not analyze whether the Buyer was ready, 
willing, and able, but reached its conclusion based on the plain language of the 
commission provision. 37 Aspenwood argued, and the trial court agreed, that the Seller 
became obligated to pay a commission the moment that the Seller accepted an offer.38 
With liability decided, the only remaining issue was which defendant, if any, would be 
held liable. 
The question of which defendant would be liable was resolved in several steps, 
both before and during the trial. Just before trial, it appears that the parties (all plaintiffs 
and all defendants) stipulated to dismissing Still Standing on two conditions: 1) liability 
would be determined between Chuck and Cathy; and 2) Chuck and Cathy would not be 
allowed to argue that Still Standing was liable. 39 
At this pretrial hearing, the judge suggested to Aspenwood that it dismiss Still 
Standing.40 The court believed that Aspenwood did not have a solid case against Still 
Standing and that leaving Still Standing in the case would confuse the jury.41 In addition, 
the court stated that if Still Standing was left in the case then Chuck and Cathy would be 
35 R. at 8382, pp. 78:22-79:3. 
36 R. at 8382, p. 77:15-25; see also R. at 5611; 8384, p. 72:4-14, 8385, p. 219:11-13. 
37 R. at 8382, p. 77:15-25. 
38 R. at 1517-19; 8382, p. 77:15-25. 
39 R. at 8383, pp. 16:8-18:15. Ex. B, Addendum. 
40 R. at 8383, pp. 12:16-13:11. 
41 Id. 
8 
allowed to argue to the jury that Still Standing was the party liable to par the 
commission. 42 
At that point, Aspenwood agreed to release Still Standing on the condition that 
liability would be determined between Chuck and Cathy: 
The only reason at this point in time we still have the LLC involved 
is because the last thing we want to do is go to trial, let the LLC out and 
have the argument be, they should have gone after the LLC .... [I]fwe 
have a stipulation here that the LLC is off limits ... we'll stipulate to that. 
If all we can have now is a trial as to ... Chuck Schvaneveldt and Cathy 
Code's liability on this and they can't throw blame at an empty chair, we 
won't pursue Still Standing Stables. 43 
The court then asked whether the parties would accept an instruction to the jury 
stating that Still Standing was not liable and the jury could look only to Chuck and Cathy 
~ for liability.44 Chuck and Cathy did not object.45 Aspenwood, on the other hand, indicated 
it would accept the instruction only if Chuck and Cathy would honor that instruction by 
not arguing or presenting evidence that Still Standing was the liable party.46 Aspenwood 
repeated this condition again before the hearing was over.47 And Aspenwood confirmed 
this understanding months later, at a post-trial hearing regarding attorney fees. 48 
After the parties stipulated to dismissing Still Standing, the trial opened with 
Chuck and Cathy as defendants. With one exception, Chuck and Cathy adhered to the 
stipulation. The one exception occurred when Chuck attempted to offer testimony that he 
42 See R. at 8383, p. 13:4-11. 
43 R. at 8383, p. 17:10-22. 
44 R. at 8383, pp. 18:23-19:3. 
45 Id. 
46 R. at 8383, p. 18:4-15. 
47 R. at 8383, pp. 28:8-29:5. 
48 R. at 8390, p. 47:10-21. 
9 
had written "Member" next to his name in the REPC to indicate that he had signed the 
REPC in a representative capacity .49 
Aspenwood objected to this evidence and the parties conferred with the court to 
resolve the objection.50 The court suggested bringing Still Standing back into the case as 
a potentially liable party. 51 Instead of agreeing that Still Standing be brought back into 
the case, or asserting that the testimony should be allowed, Chuck's counsel suggested 
that the.parties instruct the jury to disregard Chuck's testimony. 52 Aspenwood and the 
court agreed to this suggestion, and the jury was informed that it should disregard 
Chuck's testimony regarding writing "Member" next to his name in the REPC.53 
At the close of Aspenwood's case in chief, both Chuck and Cathy moved for a 
directed verdict.54 Chuck's motion was denied, but Cathy's was granted and she was 
dismissed from the case. 55 
At this point, Chuck was in a difficult position. The court had already ruled as a 
matter of the law that a commission had been earned. Chuck was now the only remaining 
defendant. But Chuck's liability was not a foregone conclusion.56 To avoid liability, 
Chuck attempted to avoid liability by arguing to the jury that the REPC signed by Chuck 
49 R. at 8385, pp. 13:7-16:22. 
so R. at 8385, pp. 24:12-41:18. 
51 R. at 8385, p. 28:10-14. 
52 R. at 8385, pp. 30:6-31:10. 
53 R. at 8385, pp. 40:8--43:1. 
54 R. at 5317-21; 8385, pp.192:3-193 :21, 207:2-213:20. 
55 R. at 5423-25; 8385, pp. 205:4-206:25, 218:20-221 :1. 
56 R. at 8386, p. 85:9-13. 
10 
was not connected to the FSBO,57 that Chuck did not ratify Cathy's signature on the 
FSBO,58 and that no evidence showed that the FSBO had been signed before the REPC 
had been signed. 59 
After hearing the evidence, the jury sided with Aspenwood, making two critical 
factual findings: 1) Chuck had ratified Cathy's signature on the FSBO; and 2) the 
evidence showed that Chuck had agreed to be bound by the FSBO.60 As a result, the jury 
determined that Chuck owed a commission to Aspenwood. 61 This determination was 
supported by testimony at trial that Chuck told Aspenwood that he would pay the 
commission62 and that Aspenwood expected Chuck to pay the commission personally.63 
Chuck responded to the unfavorable verdict by submitting a motion for judgment 
vi) notwithstanding the verdict.64 This motion was based on several grounds, none of which 
asserted that Still Standing should have been found liable rather than Chuck. 65 The court 
denied the motion. 66 
57 R. at 8387, pp. 78:24-79:5, 83:11-86:22. 
58 R. at 8387, pp. 81:16-82:18, 91:22-92:16 ("Remax has failed to satisfy [its] burden 
primarily because Mr. Schvaneveldt never intended to ratify or adopt the - - the 
contract"). 
59 R. at 8387, pp. 87:1-90:17. 
60 Ex. A, Addendum. 
61 Id. 
62 R. at 8385, pp. 104:13-20, 116:23-118:20, 119:13-16, 188:14-24. 
63 R. at 8385, pp. 128:16-129:6, 175:18-24. 
64 R. at 5393-94. 
65 R. at 5395-420. 
66 R. at 5615-19. 
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Ten months after the trial ended, Chuck submitted a motion to dismiss based on 
newly discovered evidence concerning a man named Dale Quinlan. 67 In essence, Chuck 
claimed that this new evidence showed that Quinlan had originally owned ~e Remax 
Elite dba.68 According to Chuck, this somehow made Quinlan Remax Elite's principal 
broker and the only party entitled to seek the FSBO commission.69 
The Dale Quinlan evidence falls into five categories: 
•·. --documents suggesting that Quinlan originally owned the Remax Elite-=dba; 70 
• an affidavit from Quinlan stating that he had never transferred his rights to 
the FSBO commission to Aspenwood;71 
• an "Expert Forgery Report" ( offered years after the expert discovery 
deadline) purporting to establish that a transfer of the Remax Elite dba to 
Aspenwood was based on forged signatures; 72 
• a document from the State of Utah (obtained ex parte) stating that the 
Remax Elite dba had been returned to Quinlan in December of2013;73 and 
• documents suggesting that Quinlan had settled his purported right to the 
FSBO commission and had assigned the Remax Elite dba to Still 
S d. 74 tan mg .. 
This untimely evidence directly contradicted the evidence that was uncontested at 
trial, where Skip Wing testified that he was Remax Elite's principal broker75 and that the 
Remax Elite dba belonged to his brokerages (the plaintiffs Aspenwood Real Estate 
67 R. at 6864-66. 
68 R. at 6867. 
69 R. at 6869-71. 
70 R. at 6873-74. 
71 R. at 6886-87. 
72 R. at 7066-87. 
73 R. at 8129. 
74 R. at 7051-52; 8124-26; 8138; 8142; 8151-52. 
75 R. at 8384, pp. 163:15-17, 183: 12-15. 
12 
. "-' 
Corporation and Elite Legacy Corporation).76 In addition, Tim Shea testified that he 
worked for Remax Elite and that Skip Wing was Remax Elite's principal broker. 77 
In contrast, no party attempted to introduce evidence at trial showing that 
Aspenwood did not own the Remax Elite dba or that the Remax Elite dba was not 
properly registered. Indeed, Chuck's own counsel throughout trial constantly referred to 
Remax Elite and the named plaintiffs interchangeably, including referring to Skip Wing 
as Remax Elite's principal broker.78 At one point Chuck's counsel even proposed a jury 
instruction that referred to Skip Wing as Remax Elite's broker.79 But Dale Quinlan's 
name did not come up at trial. Not once. 
Partially because Quinlan did not come up during trial, the trial court absolutely 
~ refused to consider the untimely Dale Quinlan evidence: "Raising this question of fact 
concerning the standing of the plaintiffs at this late date is unwarranted .... Raising new 
factual issues nearly a year after a jury trial and six months after entry of judgment will 
not be permitted. "80 
The court used Rules 59 and 60 as guidance, noting that those rules would not 
;;p allow evidence that could have been discovered earlier through due diligence.81 And here, 
the court reasoned, it was beyond belief that Chuck could not have discovered the Dale 
76 R. at 8384, pp. 164:19-165:21; see also R. at 8384, p. 172:5-12. 
77 R. at 8385, pp. 87:15-88:2. 
78 E.g., R. at 8384, 149: 24-150:5, 153:5-12, 172:5-7, 174:3-9, 178: 12-13; 8385, pp. 
J 64:16-19, 65:22-66: 1; 8387, pp. 78: 16-79:5, 82: 12-18, 83:2-6, 91 :22-92:4, 92: 14-16. 
79 R. at 8384, p. 67:8-19. 
80 R. at 7013. Ex. C, Addendum. 
s1 Id. 
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Quinlan evidence through due diligence. 82 Based on its refusal to consider the new 
evidence, the court denied the motion to dismiss.83 
Chuck persisted. Three weeks after filing Chuck's first post-trial motion to 
dismiss, Chuck and Still Standing filed a second motion to dismiss based on a purported 
settlement agreement. 84 This motion claimed that Dale Quinlan and the defendants had 
reached a settlement agreement regarding the FSBO commission. 85 
Again, the.trialcourt absolutely refused to consider new evidence: [T]his court- ....... 
cannot consider new evidence from Defendants after a final judgment .... "86 The court 
stated that the evidence could have been discovered earlier through due diligence, and 
that this failure to timely discover and present the evidence was a "fatal flaw" to 
considering it. 87 
Three weeks after filing the second motion, Chuck submitted a third motion based 
on the Dale Quinlan evidence. 88 Chuck asked the court under Rule 52 to amend the 
findings in the final judgment, asserting that the judgment should be revised to reflect 
that Dale Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba and was therefore the contracting party in 
the FSB0.89 
In response, the trial court refused a third time to consider the Dale Quinlan 
82 Id. 
83 R. at 7016. 
84 R. at 6987-93. 
85 Id. 
86 R. at 7147. Ex. D, Addendum. 
87 R. at 7148. 
88 R. at 7088-90. 
89 R. at 7093-104. 
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evidence: "[T]he Court's ruling is that there is no latitude under Rule 52 to consider new 
evidence. "90 
One month after submitting the third motion, Chuck submitted a fourth motion, 
this time requestingrelieffromjudgment under Rule 60(b).91 In this motion, Chuck 
asserted that he had exercised due diligence to obtain the Dale Quinlan evidence and that 
the Dale Quinlan evidence established that Aspenwood did not have standing.92 
Yet again, the trial court refused to consider the untimely Dale Quinlan evidence: 
The Court's observation of this case, from the review of the proceedings up 
to the point of trial and then during the post-trial process, is that this issue 
of Mr. Quinlan's ownership of the dba, and his derivative right therefore to 
effectively control these claims or to transfer them, assign them, or 
compromise them, is a construct, all of which has occurred after trial. ... 
None of those issues have ever been presented on an evidentiary basis 
to the Court, and the Court, in light of both the timing of its presentation, 
the fact that Mr. Quinlan's involvement, both in the business entity and in 
the registration of the dba, is a matter of public record that has existed for 
many years, and questions that the Court has raised with respect to these 
documents, the Court will simply not countenance the legal argument that 
Mr. Quinlan is effectively the superseding entity with respect to these 
claims, and that argument is not given further legal consideration by the 
Court.93 
One last attempt was made to introduce the Dale Quinlan evidence, this time by 
Still Standing. In this fifth attempt, Still Standing moved the court to substitute Still 
Standing as the plaintiff under Rule 25.94 Still Standing relied on the Dale Quinlan 
90 R. at 8238. Ex. E, Addendum . 
.;;J 91 R. at 7287-94. 
92 R. at 7311-18. 
93 R. at 8264-65 (emphasis added). Ex. F, Addendum. 
94 R. at 8112. 
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evidence to suggest that Quinlan had transferred its rights in the case to Still Standing, 
and therefore Aspenwood should be replace with the "true claimholder," Still Standing.95 
The trial court refused to depart from its earlier rulings: 
Defendants' Rule 25( c) motion raises an issue essentially identical to an 
issue that the Defendants have raised previously, i.e. the claim that Still 
Standing Stables, as the asserted current owner of the dba "Remax Elite," 
either by assignment from Dale Quinlan or by separate administrative 
determination by the Department of Corporations, owns the right to control 
the judgment in this case. In past hearings, the court has ruled that the 
evidence and arguments supporting these assertions of Still Standing 
Stables were not timely brought in this case and are not now pro~erly 
before the court. The court declines to modify its earlier rulings. 6 
After this motion was resolved, the litigation finally moved on to appellate review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In September, 1998, Still Standing bought a property located in Weber County 
(the Property) from the Utah School and Institutional Lands Administration (SITLA).97 
SITLA notified Still Standing and Chuck that the Property likely had no public access.98 
Despite the notice from SITLA, Still Standing attempted to establish that the 
Property had public access by filing a lawsuit against the property owners whose land 
separated the Property from the only nearby public road.99 The judge in that case found 
that the Property had no access, that Still Standing knew there was no access, and that the 
claim was frivolous. 100 
95 R. at 8112-16. 
96 R. at 8453-54. Ex. G, Addendum. 
97 R. at 2900. 
98 R. at 2901. Gi 
99 Id. 
100 R. at 2901-2; Still Standing Stable, L.L.C. v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, 111-5, 122 P.3d 556. 
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After that case ended, Still Standing purchased a narrow five-acre strip of land (the 
' 
Strip) bordering the Property in an attempt to obtain public access. 101 The Strip is on the 
Property's south side, while the only nearby public road is north of the Property. 102 
In December 2005, Metro Title issued an ALT A Owner's Title Commitment for 
the Strip. 103 The Title Commitment refused to insure access to the Strip.104 In other 
words, Chuck knew from the earlier lawsuit that the Property had no public access and 
knew through the title policy that the Strip had no public access. 
Six weeks later, Chuck entered into a For Sale by Owner Commission 
Agreement, 105 in which he agreed to pay a commission equal to 3% of the purchase price 
if he accepted an offer to purchase the Property. 106 The FSBO listed the Seller as Chuck 
~ and Cathy Code, which the jury reformed to define the Seller as Chuck Schvaneveldt and 
Cathy Code. 107 The FSBO does not reference Still Standing in any way or express that 
Chuck or Cathy were acting on Still Standing's behalf.108 
About two weeks later, Chuck signed a REPC and accepted an offer to purchase 
the Property. 109 The REPC required Chuck to provide a general warranty deed at 
101 R. at 2902. 
102 R. at 2902. 
103 R. at 2903. 
104 R. at 2903. 
105 Cathy Code signed the FSBO on Chuck's behalf, and the jury found that Chuck 
ratified that signature. Ex. A, Addendum. 
106 Ex. 5, Br. of Appellant, ,r 2. 
107 Ex. A, Addendum. 
108 Ex. 5, Br. of Appellant. 
109 Ex. 6, Br. of Appellant, § 25. 
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closing.110 The REPC listed Chuck as the Seller, and did not express that Chuck was 
acting on behalf of another entity. 111 The REPC described the Property as "Land LLC 
Still Standing Stables" but did not indicate that Still Standing was a party to the REPC. 112 
The day after Chuck signed the REPC, Metro Title issued an ALTA Owner's Title 
Commitment for the Property. 113 This Title Commitment refused to insure access to the 
Property.114 
The day after receiving. this title policy, Chuck signed the Seller's Property 
Condition Disclosures, in which he represented that there was direct access to the 
Property through a private easement.115 Chuck made this representation despite the 
lawsuit establishing that no access existed and two title policies refusing to insure access. 
Two months later, Metro Title issued yet another ALTA policy, this one refusing 
to insure access to both the Property and the Strip.116 Despite receiving this ALT A policy, 
Chuck did not amend his inaccurate representation in the Seller's Property Condition 
Disclosures as he was required to do.117 
llO Id. § 10.1. 
111 Id. § 25. 
112 Id. § l. 
I13 R. at 2904. 
114 Id. 
115 R. at 1537. 
116 R. at 2904. 
117 R. at 1538. 
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As the closing date approached, Chuck indicated that he would be providing a 
special warranty deed at closing, not a general warranty deed as required by the REPC. 118 
The special warranty. deed would not guarantee access to the Property.119 
At this point, the Buyer had arranged all the necessary financing and was ready to 
close the deal. 120 But after learning that Chuck would not fulfill his contractual. obligation 
to provide a general warranty deed, the Buyer decided not to go through with the deal. 121 
Nevertheless, Chuck attempted to complete the transaction by showing up at closing and 
signing the closing documents. 122 
During this process, the real estate agent brokering the deal was Tim Shea. 123 Tim 
Shea worked for Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation, which was doing business as 
l.4ii) Remax Elite, with Skip Wing as the principal broker. 124 Aspenwood Real Estate later 
became Elite Legacy Corporation, which also did business as Remax Elite with Skip 
Wing as the principal broker.125 Skip has since retired, 126 while Tim has moved to 
Colorado. 127 Both Aspenwood Real Estate and Elite Legacy have ceased operating and 
will conclude their winding up phase as soon as this litigation ends.128 
118 R. at 2913-15; 8385, pp. 135:17-136:19, 187:17-188:3. 
119 R. at 2913-15. 
120 R. at 8385, pp. 135:17-136:19. 
121 Id. 
122 R. at 367. 
123 E.g., R. at 8385, pp. 128:16-129:6, 175:18-24. 
124 R. at 8384, pp. 163:15-17, 164:19-165:21, 183: 12-15; 8385, pp. 87:15-88:2. 
125 R. at 8384, pp. 164: 19-165:26. 
126 R. at 8384, p. 164:13-18. 
127 R. at 8385, p. 86:12-13. 
128 See R. at 1092; 1483-85. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Aspenwood has standing. 
At this stage of litigation, Chuck may establish that Aspenwood does not have 
standing only ifno evidence exists to support Aspenwood's standing. Evidence was 
introduced at trial showing that Skip Wing was the proper principal broker to bring the 
claim and that the plaintiffs were properly operating under the Remax Elite dba. No 
conflicting evidence was offered until,,nearly a year after trial, and the trial court deemed 
the evidence untimely and refused to consider it. As a result, substantial evidence 
establishes that Aspenwood has standing, no conflicting evidence exists, and therefore 
Chuck's standing argument fails. 
Il. A commission was earned as a matter of law. 
The FSBO provides that Aspenwood earned a commission if the Seller accepted 
an offer to purchase the Seller's property. It is undisputed that the Seller accepted an offer 
to purchase the Seller's property. Therefore Aspenwood earned a commission. This is 
true even though even though the sale never went through and the FSBO states that the 
commission will be paid at closing from proceeds of the sale. Utah courts have held that 
such provisions do not affect a promise to pay a commission, even if the deal does not 
materialize. In any event, the sale failed due to the Seller's failure to provide a general 
warranty deed, as required by the REPC. 
III. Chuck is personally liable. 
Chuck waived the argument that Still Standing is liable for the commission by not 
objecting when Still Standing was dismissed, by stipulating that he would not make this 
20 
argument, and by failing to raise the argument at trial. 
In addition, the jury verdict finding Chuck liable may be overturned only if no 
evidence exists to support it. Evidence was introduced at trial that Chuck told Aspenwood 
he would pay the commission and that Aspenwood expected Chuck to pay the 
commission personally. In addition, the FSBO and the REPC list Chuck as the Seller, but 
do not name Still Standing or express that Chuck was acting on behalf of Still Standing. 
As a result, substantial evidence exists to support the jury verdict and therefore the 
verdict may not be disturbed. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
Aspenwood has standing to maintain this action. 
As a preliminary matter, it is unclear whether Chuck is appealing a specific 
standing ruling or simply raising the issue on appeal independent of any trial court ruling. 
Aspenwood assumes that Chuck is appealing one of the five post-trial rulings regarding 
standing because Chuck's argument relies upon evidence that was offered, but not 
considered, nearly a year after trial. 
A. Chuck's standing argument may prevail only ifno evidence supports the 
Plaintiffs' claim to standing. 
The Utah Supreme Court declared in 2010 that challenges to standing must be 
,.i; evaluated using the standard for a dispositive motion at the relevant stage of litigation.129 
At this stage of litigation (i.e., after a jury trial has been held, a verdict returned, and a 
final judgment entered), the appropriate dispositive motion is a motion for judgment 
129 Brown v. Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14, ,i 15,228 P.3d 747. 
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notwithstanding the verdict. 130 Therefore Chuck's challenge to Aspenwood's standing 
must be evaluated under the standard for a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. 131 
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be granted only if no 
substantial evidence supports the verdict and the losing party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law .132 All evidence and reasonable inferences that support the verdict must be 
accepted as true, while conflicting evidence, must be disregarded. 133 In addition, the 
evidence must be taken as it existed at the close of trial, 134 and appellate courts give 
deference to factual determinations that affect standing. 135 
In this case, the standing argument fails because substantial evidence was 
introduced at trial showing that Aspenwood has standing. The witnesses Skip Wing and 
Tim Shea both testified that Skip was Remax Elite's principal broker, thus satisfying the 
requirement in Utah Code§ 61-2f-305 that the principal broker bring the lawsuit.136 And 
while no testimony was offered to show the registration required by § 42-2-6.6, this 
registration can be reasonably inferred from Skip's testimony that Aspenwood owned the 
130 Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b); see also Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 431 P.2d 566, 568-69 (Utah 
1967). 
131 Brown v. Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14, ,i 15. 
132 Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988); Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 431 P.2d at 
568-69. 
133 Koerv. Mayfair Mkts., 431 P.2d at 568-69. 
134 Franklin v. Stevenson, 1999 UT 61, ,i 7, 987 P.2d 22 ("[T]he evidence must be taken 
as it existed at the close of the trial .... ") (quoting Townsend v. United States Rubber 
Co., 392 P.2d 404 (N.M. 1964)). 
135 Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ,i 10, 154 P.3d 808 (internal citations omitted). 
136 R. at 8384, pp. 163:15-17, 183: 12-15; 8385, pp. 87:15-88:2. 
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Remax Elite dba and was operating as Remruc Elite.137 Chuck's own counsel referred to 
Aspenwood throughout trial as Remruc Elite and stated that Skip Wing was Remax Elite's 
principal broker. 138 In contrast, no evidence was offered at trial to suggest that 
Aspenwood did not own or had not properly registered the Remax Elite dba. 
Indeed, Chuck did not even attempt at trial to offer evidence showing that Skip 
Wing was not Remruc Elite's principal broker, that the Remruc Elite dba was not properly 
·· registered, or that some other party was the true owner of the Remruc Elite dba. 139 
Nothing was preventing Chuck from introducing this evidence. Chuck simply abandoned 
his standing argument once the current plaintiffs were added to the case. 
As a result, where all trial evidence supports the conclusion that Aspenwood has 
~ standing and no contrary evidence was offered, Chuck's standing argument fails. This is 
true despite Chuck's efforts to introduce "newly discovered" evidence nearly a year after 
trial. 
B. The trial court deemed untimely and did not consider evidence on standing 
offered for tlie first time nearly a year after trial. 
Standing is a jurisdictional matter that can be raised at any time, including after 
trial or on appeal. 140 But evidence supporting a standing argument may be excluded as 
137 R. at 8384, pp. 164:19-165:21. Pretrial evidence also showed thatAspenwood had 
f[soperly registered the Re~ax Elite ~ba. R._at 2167-6~ . . . 
E.g., R. at 8384, pp. 149. 24-150.5, 153.5-12, 172.5-7, 174.3-9, 178. 12-13, 8385, 
.;; pp. 64:16-19, 65:22-66:1; 8387, pp. 78:16-79:5, 82:12-18, 83:2-6, 91:22-92:4, 92:14-
16. 
139 See pp. 12-13, supra. 
140 Sonntag v. Ward, 2011 UT App 122, ,r 2,253 P.3d 1120. 
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untimely.141 And evidence that the trial court did not consider cannot be considered on 
appeal. 142 In this case, Chuck's standing argument relies entirely on evidence that the trial 
court deemed untimely and refused to consider. Thus, while standing is an argument that 
cannot be waived, Chuck in effect waived his Quinlan argument by failing to timely offer 
supporting evidence. 
The Dale Quinlan issue first surfaced nearly a year after trial, when Chuck began 
attempting to introduce evidence related to Quinlan's purported ownership ofRemax 
Elite. This Dale Quinlan evidence purported to establish that Quinlan, not Aspenwood, 
was the true owner of the Remax Elite dba ( and therefore Quinlan was somehow the true 
party entitled to the commission). 
Chuck and Still Standing clearly realized that the Dale Quinlan evidence was 
crucial to their standing argument-in total, Chuck, Still Standing, or both together 
submitted five post-trial motions asking the court to consider the Dale Quinlan evidence. 
In each instance, the trial court absolutely refused to consider the Dale Quinlan 
evidence. 143 In doing so, the court emphasized that this evidence could have been 
discovered with due diligence-ostensibly the very day the lawsuit was filed. The court 
also noted that it was simply improper to raise factual issues for the first time nearly a 
141 See Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23, ,i,i 49-51, 232 P.3d 486 (explaining that trial 
courts have broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, including evidence the court 
deems untimely) (internal citations omitted). 
142 Pilcher v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 663 P.2d 450,453 (Utah 1983) ("Matters not admitted 
in evidence before the trier of fact will not be considered here.") (citing Corbet v. Corbet, 
472 P.2d 430,433 (1970) ("On Appeal to this court we review the judgments and orders 
appealed from on the basis of the record upon which the trial court acted, and do not 
p,ermit the supplementing of our record with matters not before the trial court.")). 
43 See pp. 12-16, supra. 
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year after trial. 
In the end, despite Chuck's tenacity, the court never considered any evidence that 
would contradict the facts established at trial: Skip Wing was Remax Elite's principal 
broker and was entitled to seek a commission. This is a fatal flaw in Chuck's argument. 
The Dale Quinlan evidence-which Chuck's standing argument depends upon-may not 
be considered on appeal. Without any supporting evidence, Chuck's standing argument 
necessarily fails. 
C. Even if the untimely evidence is considered, Chuck's argument/ails as a 
matter of law. 
Chuck asserts that the assumed-name statute prevents Aspenwood from 
maintaining this lawsuit because the Remax Elite dba either has expired or belongs to 
Still Standing. 144 Even if Chuck has not waived this argument and some evidence exists 
that Aspenwood did not properly register the dba, Chuck's standing argument still fails, 
.,;) for three reasons: First, the assumed-name statute does not bar Aspenwood from 
maintaining this action. Second, any failure to properly register the dba can still be cured. 
Third, public policy does not allow cases to be dismissed based on evidence offered 
nearly a year after trial. 
1. The assumed-name statute does not prevent Aspenwood from maintaining 
this lawsuit. 
The assumed-name statute requires a party conducting business under an assumed 
name to properly register that name before the party may maintain judicial 
144 Br. of Appellant, pp. 38--40; Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-10 (2015). 
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proceedings.145 This statute does not apply to Aspenwood because Aspenwood is not 
conducting business under an assumed name. 
Clearly Aspenwood conducted business in the past under the assumed name 
Remax Elite. This was established by testimony at trial. But the Aspenwood plaintiffs no 
longer conduct any business at all: Skip Wing is retired and Aspenwood and Elite Legacy 
ceased operating years ago.146 Where the assumed-name statute applies only to parties 
actively conducting business, and where the Aspenwood. plaintiffs no longer conduct 
business, the assumed-name statute does not apply to the Aspenwood plaintiffs. 
More importantly, the pretrial and trial evidence supports the conclusion that 
Aspenwood properly maintained its dba during all times that Aspenwood was conducting 
business under the name Remax Elite. 147 This includes proper registration at the time this 
lawsuit was initiated.148 But once Aspenwood ceased conducting business as Remax 
Elite, the assumed-name statute no longer required Aspenwood to properly register the 
Remax Elite dba. 
This analysis comports with the purpose of the assumed-name statute: to notify the 
public who owns the business and protect those who transact business with the 
underlying owner. 149 The Remax Elite dba was properly registered during all times that 
Aspenwood was conducting business, and therefore all parties conducting business with 
145 Utah Code Ann.§ 42-2-10 (2015). 
146 R. at 1092; 1483-85; 2153; 8384, p. 164:13-18. 
147 R. at 2167-68; 8384, pp. 163:15-17, 164:19-165:21, 183: 12-15; 8385, pp. 87:15-
88:2. 
148 See R. at 2167-68. 
149 Putnam v. lndust. Comm'n, 14 P.2d 973 (Utah 1932). 
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Aspenwood-including Chuck-had notice concerning the use of the assumed name. 
Once Aspenwood shut down, there was no longer a need to protect persons transacting 
business with Aspenwood (since no business was being transacted at all), and thus no 
longer a need to register the Remax Elite dba. 
In addition, the statute requires only that "the provisions of [ the assumed-name] 
chapter are complied with" before a party may maintain a lawsuit. 150 If the Dale Quinlan 
evidence is· accepted as true, that evidence would_ establish that the provisions of the 
chapter have been complied with (i.e., the Remax Elite dba is registered and active). And 
if the provisions of the assumed-name chapter are complied with, the statute is satisfied 
and allows Aspenwood to maintain its case. 
2. Any failure to comply with the assumed-name statute may be cured. 
Still Standing's registration of the Remax Elite dba is a highly questionable 
litigation tactic: it appears that Still Standing registered the Remax Elite dba for the sole 
purpose of preventing Aspenwood from registering the dba and to avoid resolving this 
case on the merits. This Court should disregard evidence of registration for that reason 
.,i} alone. 151 
But even if this Court considers the untimely Quinlan evidence and determines 
that Still Standing owns the Remax Elite dba, Aspenwood can still cure this defect by 
recovering and properly registering the Remax Elite dba. The recovery process would 
.;,; 150 Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-10 (2015). 
151 See Salcedo v. Asociacion Cubana, Inc., 368 So. 2d 1337, 1339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1979) ("(C]ourts will not allow the practice of the ... 'gotcha!' school oflitigation to 
succeed."). 
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require time and possibly another round of litigation (the last thing this lawsuit needs). 
But Still Standing's claim to the Remax Elite dba would not withstand judicial scrutiny, 
for two reasons: 1) Still Standing's registration ofRemax Elite violates the assumed-
name statute; and 2) even if Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba, Quinlan had no right to 
transfer it to Still Standing. 
The Utah Code does not allow Still Standing to register the Remax Elite dba if the 
dba is misleading regarding Still Standing's business purpose. 152 And the name Remax 
Elite applied to Still Standing is certainly misleading. The name Remax Elite implies that 
the underlying entity is a real estate brokerage and a Remax International franchisee. Still 
Standing is obviously not a real estate brokerage and no evidence exists to show that Still 
Standing is a Remax International franchisee. As a result, Still Standing's use of the 
Remax Elite dba is misleading and§ 42-2-6.6(l)(a) prevents Still Standing from 
maintaining that dba. 
In addition, Dale Quinlan had no right to assign the Remax Elite dba to Still 
Standing. It is common knowledge that franchisors such as Remax International keep 
close tabs on their franchisees to ensure that the franchisor's brand is protected. They do 
not allow franchisees unilaterally to assign franchise agreements or the rights to the 
franchisor's name.153 Yet this is what Still Standing claims has happened, i.e., that Dale 
152 See Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-6.6(l)(a) (2015). 
153 Evidence to this effect was submitted in a separate case filed by Still Standing 
regarding ownership of the Remax Elite dba (Second District, Case No. 130701109). Out 
of respect for the Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure, Aspenwood will not attempt to 
introduce that evidence for the first time on appeal, even though doing so would seem a 
fair response to Chuck's reliance on the untimely Quinlan evidence. But if this Court is 
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Quinlan sold the right to use the Remax Elite name to Still Standing without any 
authorization from Remax International. 
In short, Still Standing claims that it owns the Remax Elite dba, but that claim has 
never been tested. If Aspenwood is forced to use the judicial system to reclaim and re-
register the Remax Elite dba, it can and will do so. Thus, even if the assumed-name 
statute currently prevents Aspenwood from maintaining this lawsuit, Aspenwood can 
cure this defect,-·making Chuck's argument moot. 
3. Public policy does not allow final judgments to be reversed based on 
untimely evidence. 
As a public policy matter, Chuck's standing argument should not be considered. 
Dismissing a case based on evidence that was readily available but not offered until 
nearly a year after trial sets horrible precedent. Such precedent would disregard the 
fundamental protections afforded by the judicial process, including the opportunity to 
.-i) request documents from opposing parties and to depose adverse witnesses. 
Here, Aspenwood has not had these vital protections: Aspenwood had no 
opportunity to cross-examine Dale Quinlan, to depose him, to compel his appearance as a 
witness, or to subpoena documents from him or from the State of Utah that might 
undermine Chuck's new evidence. Quinlan has never appeared in any proceeding in this 
case, before, during, or after trial. Aspenwood's lack of opportunity to contest the 
Quinlan evidence is prejudicial because the Quinlan evidence leaves critical questions 
unanswered: 
inclined to take judicial notice of that case and the evidence showing that Quinlan had no 
right to own or transfer "Remax Elite," Aspenwood encourages the Court to do so. 
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• Does the Department of Corporations have authority to unilaterally 
reassign ownership of a dba? No rules or regulations were ever cited to the 
court suggesting that the Department of Corporations has this authority. 
• Who requested the reassignment? 
• What was the basis for the decision to reassign? 
• Did the Department of Corporations give notice to potentially affected 
parties? 
• Did affected parties, including Aspenwood, have an opportunity to be 
heard? 
• Who made the final decision to reassign the dba, and was that person a 
fair, neutral decision maker? 
The Quinlan evidence does not answer these questions. As a result, dismissing this case 
relying upon the incomplete Quinlan evidence amounts to a violation of Aspenwood's 
due process rights. 
In addition, allowing untimely evidence concerning standing renders "final 
judgments" forever unstable. If litigants can dismiss already-decided cases based on 
newly discovered standing evidence, virtually every case ever decided remains up in the 
air. Surely the judicial system does not allow such a result. Litigation must end sometime, 
and final judgments should be just that-final. 
II. The trial court ruled correctly that a commission bad been earned. 
A. Chuck became obligated to pay a commission the moment he accepted an offer 
to purchase the Property. 
Chuck is bound under the plain language of the FSBO to pay a commission. 
If the language within the four corners of a contract is unambiguous, a court may 
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determine the parties' intent from that language as a matter of law. 154 In this case, the 
FSBO's language regarding Chuck's obligation to pay a commission is unambiguous: 
The Seller agrees to pay the Company, irrespective of agency 
relationship(s), as compensation for services, a Brokerage Fee in the 
amount of$ ______ or 3 % of the acquisition price of the Property, 
if the Seller accepts an offer from Emmett Warren and or Assigns (the 
"Buyer"), or anyone acting on the Buyer's behalf, to purchase or exchange 
the Property. 155 
The plain language in this provision has only one condition, one "if': Chuck must 
accept an offer from the Buyer. If that one condition was satisfied, then Chuck became 
vP obligated to pay the commission. The analysis ends there. 
And Chuck clearly accepted an offer from the Buyer. The relevant facts in this 
case are quite simple: On approximately January 20, 2006, the parties entered into the 
FSBO, which contains the commission provision. Two weeks later, the Buyer sent Chuck 
a signed REPC offering to purchase the Property for $4,362,500. The next day, Chuck 
-i> signed the REPC and accepted the Buyer's offer. Chuck even attempted to go through 
with the deal by showing up at closing and signing the closing documents. By signing the 
REPC and accepting the Buyer's offer, Chuck triggered his obligation to pay a 
commission. This is true even though the sale of the Property did not materialize. 
B. The broker's commission did not depend on the Buyer's or Seller's subsequent 
performance. 
Chuck contends that he agreed to pay a commission only if the deal closed. 156 To 
154 Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, Inc., 2003 UT App 98, 115, 68 
P.3d 1038 (internal citation omitted). 
155 Ex. 5, Br. of Appellant, 12. 
156 Br. of Appellant, pp. 39-44. 
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support his position, Chuck relies on this provision in the FSBO: "The Seller agrees that 
the Brokerage Fee shall be due and payable, from the proceeds of the Seller, on the date 
of recording of closing documents for the purchase or exchange of the Property by the 
Buyer or anyone acting on the Buyer's behalf."157 
According to Chuck, this provision means that the parties agreed that the 
commission would be paid at closing from the proceeds of the sale. Thus if there were no 
· . closing and no proceeds then no payment could be due and payable. Chuck should not be 
allowed to make this argument on appeal because he did not raise this argument when 
opposing summary judgment and therefore failed to preserve it. 158 But in any event, 
under Utah law as expressed in Fairbourn Commercial Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, 159 this 
FSBO provision does not affect Chuck's obligation to pay a commission. 
1. A broker is not an insurer of the Buyer's or the Seller's subsequent 
performance. 
In Fairbourn, a seller agreed to pay a commission to a broker if the broker 
presented an offer from a buyer and the seller accepted the offer.160 Pursuant to this 
agreement the broker presented an offer from a buyer and the seller accepted the offer.161 
Even though the seller accepted the offer, the closing never occurred; the seller sold the 
property to a new buyer and then refused to pay the original broker a commission for the 
1s1 Id., p. 43. 
158 Seep. 2, supra. 
159 2003 UT App 98, 68 P.3d 1038. 
160 Id.~ 16. 
161 Id. ~~ 7-9, 17. 
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failed deal. 162 The broker sued, claiming that a commission was due under the 
agreement-even though the deal failed-because the broker had presented an offer and 
the seller had accepted the offer. 163 
The seller responded that the agreement to pay a commission was contingent on 
the parties going through with the deal. 164 The seller relied on a phrase in the agreement 
that the commission would become "due and payable at closing."165 Because no closing 
occurred, the seller argued, the commission was not due and payable but was contingent 
on a closing actually occurring. 166 
The seller's argument was rejected by the trial court, 167 the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 168 and the Utah Supreme Court. 169 The Utah Court of Appeals adopted the 
JI majority rule that the phrase "at closing" by itself does not require that a closing actually 
occur.170 
The Court of Appeals explained that this rule accords with the general rule in Utah 
that a broker is entitled to a commission even if a deal does not go through-the broker is 
not an insurer of subsequent performance by the buyer or the seller. 171 
In addition, the Court of Appeals explained that an exception to the general rule 
162 Id. ,r,r 11-12. 
163 Id. ,r 12. 
164 Id. ,r 18. 
16s Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. ,r 12. 
168 Id. ,i,i 19-23. 
169 Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. American Housing Partners, 2004 UT 54, ,r,r 7-13, 94 
P.3d 292. 
17° Fairbourn, 2003 UT App 98, ,r 21. 
171 Id. ,i,i 18, 22 (internal quotation and citations omitted). 
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arises only where a contract expressly states that a commission is contingent on a 
closing. 172 As support, the Court of Appeals quoted a New Jersey case stating that such a 
provision must clearly indicate the condition: "In order to absolve a party from the 
payment of commissions, it must clearly appear by the contract with his broker that the 
payment of commissions was made contingent upon the actual transfer of title. "173 If such 
a provision does not exist, the Court of Appeals stated that courts may not imply one.174 
.. Under this legal framework, the Court of Appeals held that the phrase5'due and 
payable at closing" does not make the payment of a commission contingent on a 
closing.175 The Court of Appeals explained that in Fairbourn the duty to pay a 
commission had only one condition precedent: the seller must accept an offer presented 
by the broker. 176 In contrast, the term "due and payable at closing" was merely a timing 
clause-it did not have any language creating a condition.177 The Court of Appeals 
reasoned that if the parties intended the commission to be contingent on closing, the 
parties would have included conditional language such as "only," "unless," "until," or 
"if."178 
The Utah Supreme Court agreed with this analysis and held that the due and 
172 See id. ,r,r 21-22. 
173 Id. ,r 21 (quoting Samuel R. Laden, Inc. v. Lidgerwood Estates, Inc., 15 N.J. Misc 498, 
192 A. 425, 428 (N.J. 1937)). 
174 Id. 119. 
11s Id. ,r21. 
176 Id. 1116, 23. 
177 Id. 1116, 22. 
11s Id. i[ 22. 
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payable clause was merely a timing clause. 179 
In addition, the Court explained that if the agreement were interpreted to condition 
payment of a commission on a closing, then the provision for earning the commission 
would become meaningless. 180 The seller had agreed-without any other conditions-to 
pay a commission if the seller accepted an offer presented by the broker. 181 That promise 
would have no meaning if the due and payable clause controlled the earning of the 
commission. 182 Where the law governing contract interpretation requires courts to give 
effect to each contractual provision, the only available conclusion was that the due and 
payable clause dealt with timing, not whether a commission had been earned. 183 
2. Chuck's promise to pay was not contingent on closing. 
The agreement here is like the agreement in Fairbourn. Like the commission 
provision in Fairbourn, the FSBO's commission provision has only one condition: Chuck 
must accept an offer from the Buyer. This provision, like the provision in Fairbourn, 
does not require that a closing occur. Quite simply, the commission was earned once the 
Seller accepted the offer. 
The trial court agreed, and its oral ruling reflected this straight-forward 
interpretation of the FSBO's plain language: 
The FSBO contract provided that ... and I'm quoting, if the seller accepts 
an offer from Emmett Warren and or assigns or anyone ... acting on the 
buyer's behalf to purchase ... or exchange the property, end of quote. It is 
179 Fairbourn, 2004 UT 54, ~ 1 I. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id 
1s3 Id. 
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undisputed that the seller did accept an offer from Emmett Warr"en LC; 
~ d h thr . . 184 there1ore, Remax earne t e ee percent comm1ss1on. 
The court's written ruling was just as simple: "Because Plaintiffs provided an offer from 
Emmett Warren, L.C., that was accepted by the Seller, ·Plaintiffs have earned the 3% 
commission as set forth in the FSBO."185 
This is the correct result even though the FSBO's due and payable clause is 
slightly different from the due and payable clause in Fairbourn. In Fairbourn the 
commission was due and payable "at closing," while the commission here is due "on the 
date of recording of closing documents .... " There is no meaningful difference here. The 
FSBO clause, like the clause in Fairbourn, concerns timing-it does not address whether 
a commission has been earned. And like the clause in Fairbourn, the FSBO due and 
payable clause contains no conditional language such as "only," "unless," ''until," or "if." 
If the parties intended the commission to be conditioned on closing, the parties would 
have included such language. 
The same reasoning applies to the FSBO's statement that the commission would 
be due and payable "from the proceeds of the sale." There is no conditional language 
here, which the parties would have included if they intended the commission to be 
conditioned on the existence of proceeds. The phrase simply does not address whether a 
commission has been earned. At best, the phrase implies a condition. But Utah law 
refuses to imply such conditions-the agreement must clearly indicate that a commission 
184 R. at 8382, p. 77:15-25. 
185 R. at 5611. 
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is contingent on the completion of the sale. 186 A phrase without conditional language 
cannot clearly indicate a condition. 
In addition, to find an implied condition in the due and payable clause would 
render the provision for earning a commission meaningless. Like the agreement in 
Fairbourn, the court must interpret the FSBO to give effect to each contractual provision. 
Here, Chuck agreed-without any other conditions-to pay a commission ifhe accepted 
an offer from the Buyer. But Chuck's promise to pay a commission would have no 
meaning if the due and payable clause controlled the earning of a commission. Ignoring 
the FSBO's provision for earning the commission violates Utah law that each contractual 
provision must be given effect. 
A deal is a deal. Chuck promised to pay a commission ifhe accepted an offer from 
the Buyer. When or how that money would be paid does not affect Chuck's promise. 
C No dispute exists regarding whether Chuck accepted an offer. 
Chuck asserts that he did not truly accept the Buyer's offer because he believed 
that the transaction would be a cash transaction.187 This assertion ignores two important 
points: I) the REPC conclusively establishes that the parties agreed that the purchase 
price would be financed; and 2) whether the Buyer used cash or financing would not 
affect Chuck in any way. 
1. The REPC clearly and conclusively indicates a financed transaction. 
Section 2 of the REPC deals with the purchase price for the Property and indicates 
186 Fairbourn, 2003 UT App 98, 1119-21. 
187 Br. of Appellant, pp. 48-50. 
37 
where the money for the purchase price would come from. The REPC provides five 
possible funding options, with a space next to each for indicating the amount to be paid 
using that option. The options include an earnest-money option (Section 2.a), a loan 
option (Section 2.b), and a cash option (Section 2.e). 
The parties entered $25,000 next to the earnest-money option. They also put an 
"X" next to the loan option, indicating that the remainder of the purchase price would be 
financed through a conventional loan. The parties did nothing to indicate in Section 2.e -. -
that the purchase price would be paid using cash. 
If Chuck expected a cash buyer, he would have indicated that in Section 2.e of the 
REPC. This is not a case where Chuck was blindsided by contractual provisions he did 
not understand. Chuck is an experienced businessman and he reviewed the REPC with 
counsel before signing it. 188 If Chuck believed he would be paid in cash, he should have 
followed up with Shea, submitted a counteroffer, or taken any step other than signing the 
REPC. And Chuck cannot insist on a cash buyer now-the REPC integrated all previous 
discussions and agreements between the parties.189 Prior discussions about a cash 
transaction, if any, did not affect the parties' final written agreement stating that the 
Buyer would obtain a loan to purchase the Property. 
2. Chuck is not affected by the Buyer's source of funds. 
In any event, Chuck has not provided any meaningful explanation for why he 
would accept a cash transaction but not a financed transaction. Unless Chuck was 
188 R. at 8385, pp. 48:17-49:1, 
189 Ex. 6, Br. of Appellant, § 14. 
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expecting a suitcase with four and a half million dollars inside, he was going to receive a 
check.from someone. 190 \Vhether that check came from the Buyer or a bank or some 
other entity does not affect Chuck's bottom line. But in the end, even if cash was 
preferable to financing, Chuck cannot complain because it was Chuck's conduct that 
caused the deal to fail. 
D. Chuck's def a ult caused the transaction to fail 
Even accepting Chuck's assertion that he was required to pay a commission only 
if the deal went through, Chuck still owes a commission because his default killed the 
deal. Chuck's attempt to sell the Property failed for one reason: Chuck did not comply 
with his obligation under the REPC to deliver a general warranty deed. Thus Chuck is the 
~ defaulting party and unquestionably owes a commission. 
When Chuck signed the REPC, he promised that he would deliver a general 
warranty deed: "Seller ... will convey good and marketable title to Buyer at Closing by 
general warranty deed. " 191 Nevertheless, as the closing date approached, Chuck informed 
the Buyer that Chuck was not willing to provide a general warranty deed, but instead 
would provide only a special warranty deed. 192 
The Buyer understandably insisted that Chuck comply with the REPC and supply 
a general warranty deed. 193 But Chuck, knowing that the Property had no legal access, 
190 Even if Chuck did demand a suitcase full of cash, the Buyer's lender probably could 
have arranged to pay Chuck via suitcase rather than check. But we think Chuck would 
have been more than happy with a check. 
191 Ex. 6, Br. of Appellant,§ 10 (emphasis added). 
192 See pp. 5-6, 19, supra. 
193 Id 
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refused. That killed the deal.194 
Chuck disagrees, and contends that he could not be held responsible for the deal's 
collapse. According to Chuck, the trial court ruled that the deal failed solely because 
Chuck could not guarantee access, while also ruling that the Buyer had waived objections 
based on access. 195 
In other words, Chuck claims that the Buyer was obligated to go through with the 
deal even without insurable access, the Buyer failed to do so, and therefore the Buyer 
caused the transaction to fail. But Chuck's explanation of why the deal failed is 
incomplete. Aspenwood argued from the beginning, and the trial court agreed, that the 
deal failed because the lack of insurable access prevented Chuck from providing a 
general warranty deed. 196 
In sum, a buyer who bargained for a general warranty deed is not obligated to 
accept a special warranty deed. The Buyer never waived this requirement. The trial court 
ruled that Chuck's refusal to provide a general warranty deed killed the deal. Thus Chuck 
is the defaulting party and unquestionably liable for paying a commission. 
E. The Buyer was ready, willing, and able to purchase the Property. 
Both parties agree that the general rule in Utah is that a broker earns a commission 
by bringing a ready, willing, and able buyer to the table. Both parties also agree that the 
general rule may be avoided by agreement, and that the general rule was avoided in this 
194 Id. 
195 Br. of Appellant, pp. 44-47. 
196 See pp. 5-6, 19, supra. 
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case. 197 The FSBO, like the agreement in Fairbourn, avoids the general rule because it 
does not address the Buyer's ability to buy the Property. The FSBO thus renders the 
Buyer's ability to pay unnecessary for Aspenwood to earn a commission, and the ready, 
willing, and able rule does not apply. The only relevant facts concern whether Chuck 
accepted an offer. 
Even if the ready, willing, and able standard applies, there is no dispute that the 
Buyer was ready, willing, and able to purchase the Property. Testimony was introduced 
both before and during trial that the Buyer had its financing in place and would have gone 
through with this deal if Chuck had provided a general warranty deed. 198 He did not 
provide a general warranty deed, and as a result the deal did not close. 
~ III. Chuck is personally liable to pay the commission. 
As a preliminary matter, it is unclear which rulings Chuck is appealing in Section 
III of his brief. Based on Chuck's Issue Statement, he appears to challenge two rulings: 1) 
the denial of Chuck's motion for summary judgment; and 2) a "ruling as a matter of law 
that [Chuck] signed the REPC in his individual capacity .... " 199 Chuck's Addendum 
contains no ruling on either issue. 
A. The trial court did not err in denying Chuck's summary judgment motion where 
the contracts refer to Chuck personally and do not express that he is acting as a 
representative. 
Concerning the first asserted error, it appears that Chuck is appealing the trial 
197 Br. of Appellant, pp. 41-42. 
198 See pp. 5-6, 19, supra. 
199 Id.' p. 2. 
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court's order dated August 13, 2010. 200 The trial court correctly denied Chuck's motion 
for summary judgment if Aspenwood demonstrated even a single issue of material fact 
that would prevent judgment as a matter oflaw.201 
To demonstrate an issue of material fact preventing judgment as a matter of law,. 
Aspenwood relied on the plain language of the relevant contracts. Aspenwood pointed 
out the undisputed facts that the FSBO defines Chuck as the Seller, that both the FSBO 
and the REPC refer to Chuck:personally, and that neither the FSBO nor the REPC 
express that Chuck is acting in a representative capacity.202 The trial court held that these 
facts were sufficient to overcome Chuck's motion for summary judgment.203 
The trial court's ruling was correct. In Utah, agents may avoid personal liability 
only if they both name their principal and express that they are acting in a representative 
capacity .204 The FSBO and the REPC refer to Chuck individually. They do not refer to 
Still Standing and do not indicate that Chuck was acting in a representative capacity. This 
evidence-at a minimum-creates a disputed factual issue preventing summary judgment 
in Chuck's favor. Indeed, this evidence is likely sufficient to sustain a summary judgment 
motion against Chuck. Thus the trial court did not err in denying Chuck's summary 
judgment motion. 
200 R. at 1890. 
201 Utah R. Civ. P. 56(b);Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36,123, 116 P.3d 323. 
202 R. at 14 79-83. 
203 R. at 1890. 
204 See pp. 48-50, infra. 
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B. Chuck cannot argue for Still Standing's liability on appeal because Chuck did 
not raise that argument at trial. 
Chuck cannot assert on appeal that the evidence shows that Still Standing, not 
Chuck, is liable to pay the commission. Chuck waived this argument by not raising it at 
trial. 
To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must specifically raise the issue and 
provide supporting legal authority and analysis such that the trial court has an opportunity 
to rule on the issue.205 Issues that are not raised at trial are usually deemed waived.206 
In this case, Chuck had ample opportunity to argue at trial that Still Standing, 
rather than himself, should be liable for the commission. But Chuck did not make that 
argument: 
• Chuck did not object when Still Standing was dismissed from the case.207 
• Chuck did not object to the jury instruction limiting liability to himself and 
Cathy.2os 
• Chuck did not argue at trial that that Still Standing was the party truly liable for 
the commission.209 
• Chuck never requested a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
asserting that Still Standing was the party truly liable for the commission. 
205 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ,I 51, 99 P.3d 801. 
206 Id 
207 R. at 8383, pp. 17:7-19:3. 
20s Id. 
209 While Chuck did testify at trial that he had written "Member" next to his name on the 
REPC, this evidence was excluded. Ifthere was any error in excluding this testimony, it 
was invited by Chuck's counsel, who suggested that the jury be instructed to disregard 
Chuck's testimony. See pp. 9-10, supra. Therefore it cannot be the basis for an appeal. 
Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, ~~ 12-13, 163 P.3d 615 (holding that when 
a party leads the trial court into committing an error, such as by stipulation to an action, 
appellate courts cannot review that error). 
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The closest Chuck came at trial to arguing for Still Standing's liability was a request for a 
jury instruction. The requested instruction stated that Chuck and Cathy could not be liable 
because the members of Still Standing had not authorized the sale of the Property.210 
In sum, Chuck never argued at trial or in post-trial motions that Still Standing 
should be liable for a commission rather than himself. In fact, Chuck invited his personal 
liability by failing to fight the dismissal of Still Standing and by not raising Still 
Standing's liability at trial. As a result, Chuck's argument regarding the liability of Still 
Standing has been waived. And even if Chuck had not waived this argument, he still 
loses on appeal because substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Chuck 
personally agreed to be bound by the FSBO. 
C. The jury-not the trial court-determined that Chuck was personally liable. 
Chuck asserts in his Issue Statement that the trial court ruled as a matter of law 
that Chuck signed the REPC in his individual capacity. 211 In his Argument section, 
Chuck asserts that the trial court ruled as a matter of law that any liability of Chuck was 
in his individual capacity.212 Both statements are inaccurate. The trial court never ruled as 
a matter oflaw that Chuck was personally liable. Instead, three events led to Chuck's 
personal liability: 
• Just before trial, Chuck and Cathy stipulated to dismissing Still Standing from the c;_, 
case on the condition that liability would be determined between Chuck and Cathy . 
and that Chuck and Cathy could not argue at trial or later that Still Standing was 
liable. 
210 R. at 5209-10. G:. 
211 Br. of Appellant, p. 2. 
212 Id., p. 50. 
• At the close of Plaintiffs' case in chief, Cathy moved for a directed verdict and 
was released from the case. 
• After Chuck concluded his defense, the jury found that Chuck agreed to be bound 
by the FSBO and that Chuck owed the commission.213 
Admittedly, this course of events left Chuck in a difficult position. The trial court 
had already ruled as a matter of law that someone had to pay a commission. By the time 
trial ended, Chuck was the only remaining defendant. But this course of events does not 
equal a ruling as a matter of law that Chuck is personally liable. 
In the end, it was the jury that found that Chuck agreed to be bound by the FSBO. 
Indeed, at trial Chuck's counsel tenaciously attempted to establish that the REPC signed 
by Chuck was not connected with the FSBO, that Chuck did not ratify Cathy's signature 
on the FSBO, and that the FSBO had been signed after Chuck signed the REPC.214 After 
hearing the evidence, the jury could have agreed with Chuck and Chuck would not have 
·;JJ been required to pay the commission. But the jury sided with Aspenwood, finding that 
the evidence showed that Chuck had agreed to be bound by the FSBO. 
Whether Chuck's personal liability resulted from a legal ruling or from the jury is 
important: a ruling as a matter of law receives no deference on appeal, while a jury 
verdict-the event that actually established Chuck's personal liability-will be sustained 
so long as some evidence and reasonable inferences support that verdict.215 
In this case, substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Chuck agreed to 
.iv 213 See pp. 8-11, supra. 
214 C" 
uee p. 11, supra. 
215 Avalos v. TL Custom, L.L.C., 2014 UT App 156, ,r 29,330 P.3d 727 (internal citation 
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be bound by the FSBO.216 Tim Shea testified multiple times at trial that Chuck agreed to 
pay the commission personally and that Tim expected Chuck to pay the commission. And 
the FSBO and the REPC both list Chuck individually without naming Still Standing or 
stating that Chuck was acting on Still Standing's behalf. This evidence clearly supports 
the verdict and therefore the verdict may not be disturbed on appeal. 
D. Even if there was a ruling as a matter of law that Chuck was personally liable, 
that ruling would have been correct. 
Chuck is personally liable because he was bound by the FSBO and the REPC in 
his individual capacity. 
The test to determine whether a party signs a contract individually or as an agent is 
simple. To avoid personal liability under a contract, an agent must show two things: 1) 
the contract names the agent's principal and 2) the contract expresses that the agent is 
acting on behalf of the principal.217 
In contrast, if the signature is that of the agent alone, without any indication that 
he is signing on behalf of another, that unqualified signature results in the agent's 
personal liability.218 In addition, when a defendant fails to indicate that he is signing as an 
agent, extrinsic evidence attempting to relieve him from liability will not be admitted.219 
In this case, both the FSBO and the REPC show that Chuck did not name a 
216 See, e.g., R. at 8385, pp. 104:13-20, 116:23-118:20, 119:13-16, 128:16-129:6, 
175:18-24, 188:14-24. 
217 Starley v. Deseret Foods Corp., 74 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Utah 1937) (internal citation 
omitted). While the rule expressed in Starley dealt with corporate negotiable instruments, 
the Utah Supreme Court later expressly approved application of the rule to both 
commercial paper and contracts. Anderson v. Gardner, 647 P.2d 3, 5 (Utah 1982). 
218 Anderson v. Gardner, 647 P.2d at 4-5. 
219 Id. 
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principal and in no way indicated that Chuck was acting in a representative capacity. 
1. The FSBO does not name Still Standing and does not indicate that Chuck 
is representing Still Standing. 
The FSBO is the starting point of any official agreement between Aspenwood and 
Chuck because the FSBO creates the obligation to pay the commission. The FSBO 
defines the "Seller" as Chuck and Cathy Code and states that "Seller" agrees to pay a 
commission.220 Similarly, the FSBO's signature block states that the "undersigned" agree 
to the FSBO's terms, the "undersigned" being Chuck and Cathy individually.221 Quite 
~ simply, the FSBO does not mention Still Standing Stables, LLC, by name or by 
implication. 
A FSBO signed on Still Standing's behalf would look much different. If Chuck 
was only a representative, the FSBO would have defined "Seller" as Still Standing, not as 
"Chuck and Cathy Code." And the signature block would indicate that Chuck was 
~ signing on behalf of Still Standing as an authorized representative (i.e., Still Standing 
Stables, LC by Chuck Schvaneveldt, its Member). And the FSBO certainly wouldn't 
have listed Cathy as a seller, where Cathy had no affiliation with Still Standing. 
2. The REPC does not name Still Standing and does not indicate that Chuck 
is representing Still Standing. 
Like the FSBO, Chuck signed the REPC without naming Still Standing or 
expressing in any way that he was signing on behalf of Still Standing. Chuck is listed as 
the Seller with no mention of Still Standing. The signature block does not indicate in any 
220 Ex. 5, Br. of Appellant, ,i,i 1-2. 
221 Id. p. 2_ 
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way that Still Standing is the true contracting party. 
If Chuck was signing the REPC on behalf of Still Standing, he could have and 
should have listed Still Standing rather than himself as the Seller. In contrast, Chuck 
listed himself-without qualification-as the Seller and did not indicate that he was 
accepting the offer as a representative. 
In sum, Utah law requires agents to name their principal and to express that they 
are acting on behalf of their principal. Because neither the FSBO nor the REPC names 
Still Standing or indicates that Chuck was signing on behalf of Still Standing, Chuck can 
be held personally liable as a matter of law. 
3. Chuck is personally liable because he did not clearly indicate that he was 
acting as an agent. 
Despite the rule requiring an agent to name his principal, Chuck asserts that he can 
be personally liable only ifhe clearly indicated that liability would be his alone.222 As 
support, Chuck cites Daines v. Vincent,223 a case where an agent named his principal in 
the contract's signature block. 
In Daines, the Utah Supreme Court held that an agent was not personally liable 
under a contract, but had signed on behalf of an LLC called ASC.224 The agent signed his 
name to the contract, but the signature line appeared directly under the heading "ASC. "225 
This clear reference to ASC meant that the parties understood that they would be dealing 
222 Br. ofAppellant,pp. 51-53. 
223 2008 UT 51, 140, 190 P.3d 1269. 
224 Id. i\1 40--41. 
22s Id. ,i 41. 
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Q 
with ASC through the agent, not with the agent in his individual capacity.226 In reaching 
its conclusion, the Court stated that an agent is personally liable only if the contract 
clearly indicates that the liability is the agent's alone.227 
This case is not like Daines because the FSB0 and the REPC do not name a 
principal. Unlike the LLC in Daines, Still Standing was not listed in the signature block 
directly above Chuck's signature. If Still Standing had been named in the FSB0 or the 
REPC, Chuck's argument might carry more weight. But under Utah law, where no 
principal is named in the FSBO or the REPC, Chuck is personally liable unless he clearly 
indicates that he is acting as an agent. 
In contrast with Daines, when a contract does not clearly indicate that the agent is 
~ acting for a principal, Utah law requires the agent to clearly indicate his representative 
capacity to avoid personal liability. 228 
In DBL Distribution, Inc. v. I Cache LLC, the Utah Court of Appeals explained 
that agents must expressly limit their signatures to their representative capacity to avoid 
personal liability .229 The Court of Appeals cited multiple Utah cases where agents were 
held personally liable: 
226 Id. 
• In Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 751-52 (Utah 1983), 
corporate officers were held liable on a promissory note where they failed 
to indicate their corporate capacity in their signatures. 
221 Id. 140. 
228 DBL Distrib., Inc. v. 1 Cache, L.L.C., 2006 UT App 400, ,r 13, 147 P.3d 478 (citing 
Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stonewood Dev. Corp., 655 P .2d 668, 668 n.1 (Utah 1982) (per 
curiam) ("[W]here it is not clear that a corporate officer signs a contract in a 
representative capacity, he is personally liable.")). 
22§ Id. 
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• In Anderson v. Gardner, 647 P.2d 3, 4-5 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that a corporate officer is personally liable where it is not clear 
that the officer signs in a representative capacity. 
• In Sterling Press v. Pettit, 580 P.2d 599, 600-01 (Utah 1978), individuals 
were held personally liable on a purported corporate check signed without 
corporate titles and using an unregistered corporate name. 
• In Starley v. Deseret Foods Corp., 93 Utah 577, 74 P.2d 1221, 1223-25 
(1938}-a case cited as controlling authority by the Daines Court-the 
Utah Supreme Court allowed an action on a note against a corporate 
secretary personally where the secretary·signed a corporate promissory note 
without adding word "Secretary" next to the signature. 
In this case, like the cases cited above, Chuck failed to limit his agreement to his 
representative capacity. As a result, he is personally liable as a matter of law. 
E. Chuck's tort claims were correctly dismissed because Chuck caused his own 
damages. 
Chuck asserts that if his personal-liability argument fails then his tort claims 
should be reinstated. 230 The trial court correctly dismissed the tort claims against 
Aspenwood for two reasons: 1) Tim Shea and Skip Wing never had a duty to Chuck; and 
2) as a matter oflaw, Chuck cannot prove that Tim or Skip caused Chuck's damages. 
When Chuck signed the FSBO, he acknowledged that Tim Shea was representing 
the Buyer only, that Chuck elected not to be represented by a real estate agent, and that 
Tim Shea's actions were for the Buyer's benefit.231 
More importantly, even if Shea had a duty, Shea did not cause Chuck's damages. 
230 Br. of Appellant, pp. 53-55. 
231 Ex. 5, Br. of Appellant, ,r 5. 
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Causation is an essential element of any tort claim.232 Thus, if Shea did not cause 
Chuck's damages, Chuck's tort claims fail as a matter of law. 
In this case Chuck has no one to blame but himself. The evidence shows, and the 
trial court agreed, that Chuck's damages resulted from Chuck's refusal to provide a 
general warranty deed.233 Had Chuck provided a general warranty deed rather than a 
special warranty deed, the deal would have gone through and no damages would have 
occurred. As a result, even if Shea had a duty to Chuck and even if Chuck's allegations 
against Shea are all true, Chuck cannot establish causation and his tort claims fail as a 
matter oflaw. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Utah law requires that contractual attorney-fee provisions be enforced.234 In this 
case, the FSBO awards attorney fees to the prevailing party.235 If the jury verdict against 
Chuck is upheld, this Court should direct the trial court to augment the judgment in the 
amount of Aspenwood's attorney fees incurred in this appeal. 
232 Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61, ,r 19,221 P.3d 219; Crestwood Cove Apartments 
v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, ,r 30, 164 P.3d 1247 . 
.J 233 See pp. 5-6, 19, supra. 
234 Wm. Douglas Horne Family Revocable Trust v. Wardley/McLachlan Dev., L.L.C., 
2013 UT App 129, ,r 14, 304 P.3d 99 (internal quotation omitted). 
235 Ex. 5, Br. of Appellant, ,r 8. 
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CONCLUSION 
Despite its extensive and complicated history, this case boils down to one simple 
question: Did Chuck agree to pay a commission? The jury found that he did. The 
evidence supports that determination. As a result, Aspenwood respectfully requests that 
the judgment in the lower court be affirmed. 
DATED and SIGNED this 13th day of May, 2015. - : 
LEBARON & J NSEN, P.C. 
I, 
Attorneys for Aspenwood 
52 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. P.24(f)(l) 
because it contains 13,929 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Utah R. 
App. P. 24(f)(l)(B). 
This brief complies with the typeface req~irements of Utah R. App. P.27(b) 
~ because it has been prepared in a proportionally-spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 
2003 in Times New Roman, 13 size font. 
~-
Dallin T. Morrow 
Dated: May 13, 2015 
53 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellees to be served via first class U.S. mail, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Karra J. Porter (#5223) 
Philip E. Lowry (#6603) 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P .C. 
257 East 200 South, Ste. 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
. on this 13th day of May, 2015. 
54 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A: Special Verdict Form 
1/J 
EXHIBIT B: Excerpt from August 3, 2012 Hearing (stipulation to dismiss 
Still Standing) 
EXHIBIT C: Excerpt from Ruling and Order on Chuck's Motion to Dismiss 
~ (first ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence) 
EXHIBIT D: Ruling and Order on Motion to Dismiss based on Settlement 
Agreement (second ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan 
evidence) 
'-0 
EXHIBIT E: Excerpt from Ruling and Order on Defendants' Rule 52(b) 
Motion (third ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan 
evidence) 
~ EXHIBIT F: Excerpt from Ruling and Order on Defendants' Rule 60(b) 
Motion (fourth ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan 
evidence) 
EXHIBIT G: Ruling and Order on Defendants' Rule 25(c) Motion (fifth and 
.J final ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence) 
EXHIBIT A 
Special Verdict Form 
\. .. · .. • 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND Jl.JDICIAL 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HILARY "SKJP" Wll'lG dba REMAX 
ELITE; ASPENWOOD REAL ESTATE 
CORPORATION dba REMAX ELITE; and 
ELITE LEGACY CORPORATION dba 
REMAX ELIIB. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CHUCK SCHVANEVELDT, 
Defendant. 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
I 
I 
I 
l 
I 
; 
Case No. 060906802 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
AUG 1 3 2012 
Please answer the following questions in the order they are presented. If you find that the 
issue has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, answer "Yes." If you find that the 
evidence is equally balanced or that the greater weight of evidence is against the issue, answer 
''No." 
At least six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they need not be the 
same six on each question. When six or more of you have agreed on the answer to each question 
that is required to be answered, your foreperson should sign and date the form and advise the 
bailiff that you have reached a verdict. 
I. Do you as a jury find that placing the names "Chuck and Cathy Code" on the For Sale By 
Owner Agreement was a mistake, and should be changed so that where the For Sale By Owner 
Agreement says "Chuck and Cathy Code" it should say "Chuck Schvaneveldt and Cathy Code"? 
1 ( YES NO 
r.· . 8 0 
~} :.i 0 
2. Do you as a jury find that Chuck Schvaneveldt ratified Cathy Code's signature on the FSBO? 
l _LYES NO 
3. Do you as a jury find that the writings presented at trial are connected, and that connection, 
together with all other evidence, shows that Chuck Scbvaneveldt agreed to be bound by the terms 
oftheFSBO? 
/p ..LYES NO 
(I/you answer "Yes" to both questions 1 and 2, or you answer "Yes" to question 3, please 
answer questions 4 and 5 below. Jf you answer "No" to both questions 2 and 3, stop here, and 
sign and return this verdict.) 
4. Do you as a jury fmd that Chuck Schvaneveldt owes a commission to the Plaintiffs? 
7 / YES NO 
5. If your answer to Question 4 is "Yes,'' please state the amount of the commission owed: 
s 20,ott2.fLJ 
DATED this Ji2_ day of 11.af Ui6'( , 2012. 
EXHIBIT 8 
Excerpt from August 3, 2012 Hearing 
(stipulation to dismiss Still Standing) 
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Pre-Trial Conference 
Page 12 
again at the behest of the defendants. 
I empathize with your position, Mr. Fuller, but I 
also see the plaintiffs 1 position. This case is six years old 
and we need to conclude it and so I'm going to deny the motion 
to continue. If there were a stipulation, I'd grant it, even 
the day before trial, but in the absence of an agreement, 
where one side is adamant that it wants to go forward, I just 
conclude that the--a motion to continue is just untimely. 
12th. 
The Court affirms the ruling that it issued on July 
I will allow the plaintiff--or excuse me, the 
defendants, to address the Statute of Frauds as it applies to 
who signed the agreement and what was the intent of--of when 
the agreement was signed, but in terms of--of raising issues 
relative to the corporation or the--the company, the LLC, I 
just am reluctant that we get into those issues again. 
I've expressed before that I think that the 
plaintiffs really have no case.against the LLC and I think 
that you ought to back off of that. I think what it does is 
open the door for--for issues that can be potentially 
confusing and time-wasting in front of the jury. I don't have 
a problem with your exploring, you know, presenting why you 
sued the LLC as well as Chuck Schvaneveldt and Cathy Code, but 
I think at some point, to leave them in just invites a 
potential for the defendants to present evidence on things 
that are just going to be confusing and distracting to the 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
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Page 13 
issues. 
And so I would probably just appeal to you not to do 
that, but if you leave them in, then I suppose the defendants 
are entitled to explain why there is no claim against it. And 
whether you want to let that kind of evidence before the jury, 
that's up to you, I guess, so you need to make some strategic 
·decisions, but I think if you leave them in in front of that 
jury, then I'm going to allow the defendants to explain to 
e~lain why there isn't any action, because I think otherwise, 
you're leaving them out there for exposure, when I see no 
legal liability. 
And so I'll allow you to talk about the Statute of 
Frauds, but it•s going to be with--within the parameters of--
of the FSBO, and for the minute entry, that•s·the °For Sale By 
Owner Commission Agreement" is what that means. 
MR. FULLER: And your Honor, to clarify, so we're 
not precluded from exploring the--the facts and applying them 
to the substantive law, with--with or without the briefing, we 
can still, with our jury instructions that basically express 
what we think what the law is, which is all the--all I'm 
asking for is just virtually the law that we have in the jury 
instructions here, which means we--we go forward, the law is 
what it is, we apply the facts to the law, what's really just 
being giv~n up by not a continuance is--is the opportunity to-
-to dig deep into the--into the substance of these two 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
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categories, the LLC law and the Statute of Frauds--fraud law t 
in hopes of maybe cutting the trial of. J 
It just--it still means we can apply applicable, 
relevant law that--that is appropriate--
THE COURT: Well, if you--let met just help you a 
little bit--
MR. FULLER: Okay. Yes. 
THE COURT: And maybe I'm anticipating your 
argument. 
MR. FULLER: Yeah. 
THE COURT: But if you're going to attack the--the 
Court's ruling that there was a binding real estate contract, 
if you're going to use the Statute of Frauds to attack that, 
1 1 m not going to allow you to do that. Those·are issues that 
you wanted to raise, in chambers, and wanted to pursue as part 
of your motion to continue and I 1 m just going to say, you 
know, I may have--! may err if I--by this ruling if I had a 
chance to consider your arguments. I 1 m just saying that based 
on what you presented to me at the motion for summary 
judgment, I think my ruling is correct. And--and what you 
want is a chance to persuade me by requesting a continuance 
and I'm saying it 1 s just too late. You may be right, but the 
arguments are not timely. 
And I think that based on the arguments that were 
presented and the briefing that was presented, I think the 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
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Court ruled correctly, that the REPC is valid. 
MR. FULLER: And--and your Honor, if I may, in the 
Court's ruling as of February 12th, I seem to remember 
distinctly it said, when we started down some of those paths 
and I was--and I was cut off there, I had about ten points, I 
had my ten points, started with the Stewart case, for example, 
and was stopped there. It seems like your Honor said, you 
know, that's for another day, that's for another motion, 
another day, that goes to liability, which--which soon--left 
me with the impression that--
THE COURT: Did you ever present those in a timely 
fashion? 
MR FULLER: Well, that was--that hearing was on the 
12th, they had filed the--their second motion.for summary 
judgment and I had my cross motion for summary judgment with 
my ten points that I think we pretty much argued on the 12th; 
but what I--what r•m saying is, until now, just to get the 
arguments in, I think, for example, there•s a strong 
substantive argument that said it hinges on the big bearing in 
this case where the Statute of Frauds would apply. The 
statute says, was there a valid real estate purchase contract 
and if that Statute of Frauds, there needs to be--the object 
of this--or of this transaction, the piece of land owned by 
the Still Standing Stables, the LLC, and with that Statute of 
Frauds, its' so critical, because there needs to be this 
~ 
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written authority for any person to enter into that real 
estate purchase contract. And that's what hinges onto this--
THE.COURT: But see, those--
MR. FULLER: ----this FSBO--
THE COURT: --all of these issues about the 
statutory authority are issues that you raise for the first 
time today. 
MR. FULLER: And your Honor, and--and if that•s--if 
~hat's the case, I--I respectfully feel, but if it's the law, 
your Honor, and if I can bring it up before trial, fault or 
not fault of my own, it seems like if I can say, your Honor, 
this--this really--this appears to be the real substantive 
law, can we apply it to--does the--does the law come down and 
say, well, he's waited, out of equity, he--he waited too long 
and we're cutting you off, if I can say this is--this is 
really the hinge of it and I feel like I'm precluded from 
anything about whether or not the real.estate purchase 
contract was valid, if I can't apply whether or not there's 
written authority for any person to--to make a valid real 
estate purchase contract. That's what I feel like I'm being 
precluded--
THE COURT: Let me--let me ask one question of--
MR. FULLER: Yes, sir, your Honor. 
THE COURT: --of plaintiff's counsel. 
The Court ruled--what is your theory right at this 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
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MR. DUNCAN: I--
THE COURT: --what is--what is the--your legal 
theory of liability under the FSBO--or excuse me, under the 
REPC? 
MR. DUNCAN: I-.-r' 11 say it this way, your Honor, 
quite frankly, we would be more than happy if the Court would 
shut off the discussion. And this is what I mean by that: 
The only reason at this point in time we still have the LLC 
involved is 'cause the last thing we want to do is go to 
trial, let the LLC out and have the argument be, they should , 
have gone after the LLC and change the whole course of 
conduct. 
If this Court is more than willing to rule or if we 
have a stipulation here that the LLC is off limits, but as to 
trying to get them, from our point of view and--and to defray 
blame from Chuck and Cathy Code, we'll stipulate to that. If 
all we can have now is a trial as to Chuck and Cathy Code's--
or Chuck Schvaneveldt and Cathy Code's liability on this and 
they can't throw blame at an empty chair, we won't pursue 
Still Standing Stables. 
THE COURT: So if I make a statement in the 
preliminary instructions that basically says that after 
meeting with counsel and going over the evidence, that I have 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
801-328-1188 
I 
I 
' I 
' 
' 
' I 
I 
Ii. 
' I 
' 
J 
August 3, 2013 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
·13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Remax Elite v. Seller Still Standing Stables 
Pre-Trial Conference 
t Page 18 i 
concluded as a matter of law that there is no liability for 
the LLC and you can look just to the other two parties for 
liability, that's satisfactory with everybody? 
MR. DUNCAN: I would be perfectly fine. I'm just 
worried about them defraying responsibility, but if there's 
that instruction and both parties will--will stick to the 
integrity of that instruction and follow that in their 
arguments and in the production of evidence, I'm happy with 
nhat. I've felt that way all along, I just have not been 
wanting to jump off the fence without them jumping off, too. 
I've always felt that way. I think we had candor with the 
Court when we said in our motion for summary--or our motion 
. 
some time ago, we don't see liability on the face of the 
document for the LLC. I stick with that, I believe that, I--
I'm just not jumping off the fence until they do. 
{Off the record) 
THE COURT: The--the clerk, my law clerk suggested 
that may we could just leave them out of the instructions and 
on the caption of the suit, but I think that it really gives 
sort of a back drop in terms of who owned the property, who--
and--and how this deal was set up, but I think that if I just 
simply indicate that after listening to both sides, I have 
concluded as a matter of law that there is no liability with 
respect to the LLC and therefore, you will focus your--your 
determination of liability on Cathy Code and Chuck 
• t 
j 
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Schvaneveldt. 
MR. DUNCAN: I'm fine with that, with one caveat, I 
think this is going to be an issue that we•ve had discussion 
with opposing counsel on. Our position as to why Still 
Standing Stables is not a part of this is be--is because 
they're not a party to the FSBO contract. I think that's a 
fair statement. And the reason why I bring that up in this 
particular case is, I don't want it to be seen as a loss and 
now you're going--now you're going to pay my attorney's fees, 
because the only way you get attorney's fees in this case is 
if you're a prevailing party to the contract. 
And so, I mean, that's my concern is now, all of a 
sudden, they're going to say, well, if you agree to that, then 
you're saying you lost and you pay our attorney's fees. And I 
have concern about that. 
So I--I guess what I'm saying is, I'm more than 
willing to let--
THE COURT: Is there--is there an attorney's fee 
provision in the FSBO? 
MR. DUNCAN: In the FSBO, yes, but it's between the 
parties. And--
MR. FULLER: Yes. 
MR. DUNCAN: --and so my point is, ·is we're willing 
to let them out with the caveat that the reason we're letting 
them out is it's our position at this particular point in 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
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Defendants' Motions to Dismiss/Clarify 
On June 25, 2013, Still Standing Stables ("SSS")filed its Motion to Clarify Rulings and 
Identify Real Parties, and on June 28, 2013, Schvaneveldt :filed yet another motion to dismiss for 
lack of standing and jurisdiction. As both motions were prepared by attorney Robert Fuller and 
contain similar argwnents, the court will address them both here. 
At the outset, the court expresses its dismay that Schvaneveldt and SSS continue to raise 
issues concerning standing after this case has already been through a jury trial and attorney fees 
have been awarded. Standing is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised at any point during 
litigation. Sonntag v. Ward, 2011 UT App. 122, V 2. This court, however, loses jurisdiction once 
a final judgment is entered. This court entered a judgment of $212,806.70 against Schvanveldt 
on January 2, 2013. lbis case is over. A jury heard the issues, and the court awarded attorney 
fees to the prevailing parties. Issues regarding standing should have been raised years ago. 
The Court acknowledges that Defendants, current motions regarding standing are 
partially prompted by Plaintiffs, unmeritorious argwnent that Mr. Wing is not a party subject to 
liability for the award of attorney fees, but a simple memorandum in opposition to Mr. Wing's 
Motion to Clarify should have sufficed. This is precisely the type of cumulative end unnessary 
motion that justified the significant attorney fees awarded in this case, and caused this case to 
languish on the court's docket for years. 
Despite the court's hesitancy to even address Defendants' standing arguments, the co~ 
out of an abundance of caution, will briefly address each of Defendants' arguments. 
First, on the basis of"recent discoveries regarding the true ownership of Remax Elite" 
Schvaneveldt argues that none of the plaintiffs were parties to the FSBO or Real Estate Purchase 
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Contract ("REPC''), but rather that the dba "ReMax Elite., was registered to Dale Quinlan 
("Quinlan,,) at the time the FSBO and REPC were signe~ and that Quinlan never transferred the 
rights under the agreement to any of the plaintiffs. Raising this question of fact concerning the 
standing of the plaintiffs at this late date is unwarranted. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b), 
governing motions for relief from judgment, is instructive here. It states that relief from 
judgment based on new evidence is only permissible if (1) the motion is filed within three 
months after the judgment, and (2) due diligence could not have discovered the new evidence in 
time for a new trial under Rule S9(b ). Judgment against Schvanveldt was entered in January 
2013. Further, that judgment was entered based on a jury verdict entered in August 2012. Until 
this time, all of the parties had agreed that Mr. Wing was the principal broker ofReMax Elite, 
the contracting party. In fact, Defendants abandoned their previous arguments regarding 
standing once Mr. Wing was added as a plaintiff. Raising new factual issues nearly a year after a 
Jucy trial and six months after entry of judgment will not be permitted. Even if this motion were 
timely, Schvaneveldt has provided no explanation for why this new evidence could not have 
been discovered in time for a rule 59(b) motion. This case was filed in 2006, and the issues 
regarding the commission were first raised in 2008. It is beyond belief that Schvaneveldt could 
not have discovered this evidence with due diligence. 
Even if the court were inclined to consider Schvanveldt's new factual assertions, 
Schvanveldt's evidence attached to his Motion to Dismiss does not contradict the presumption 
that bes always been present in this case, i.e., that Mr. Wing was the principal broker associated 
with the FSBO. Schvaneveldt's evidence only shows that the dba Remax Elite was transferred to 
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Skip Wing a short time after the FSBO and REPC were consummated. It does not show that 
Quinlan did not assign the claims at some other time. 
Schvaneveldt's tries to establish that Quinlan did not transfer his claims to Mr. Wing by 
submitting his July 8. 2013 "Supplemental Authority and Exhibits in Support of: Motion to 
Dismiss Commission Claims Based on Lack of Standing and Jurisdiction" containing an 
affidavit of Dale Quinlan. Dale Quinlan states. "I do not believe nor do I have any recollection 
of ever assigning any commission agreement or contract rights between myself, doing business 
under the assumed name REMA ELITE, and the Seller, specified above, to any other individual 
nor entity." Based on this statement, and bis own observations of the signatures, Schvaneveldt 
argues that a transfer never occurred and the letters of transfer "appear to be phoney docwnents 
filed with the State of Utah Division of Corporations with fraudulent intent" 
Even if Rule 60(b) did not bar consideration of Quinlan's affidavit, which it does, the 
court never granted leave for Schvaneveldt to file "Supplemental Authority and Exhibits,, and 
will not consider it, U.R.C.P. 7{c)(l) {"No other memoranda will be considered without leave of 
court"). except to note that allegations of forgery and fraud are affinnative defenses which must· 
be raised in Defendants' Answer. U.R.C.P. 8. Although Defendants' Answer raised issues of 
forgery and fraud with respect to the FSBO and REPC, Defendants never raised any such issues 
pertaining to any Letter of Transfer; accordingly, such arguments are waived. 
Second, SSS argues that because Mr. Wing argues in his Motion to Clarify that he was 
not a party to the FSBO, Mr. Wing lacked standing to sue for the commission. Having rejected 
Mr. Wing's arguments, however, this issue is moot. The facts and procedural posture of this 
case are clear. Mr. Wing, as part of the collective "ReMax," sued the defendants for the 
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commission based on the FSBO, and Mr. Wing is the principal agent of ReMax, that was named 
as a party to the FSBO. Accordingly, Mr. Wing has standing to assert the commission claim. 
Defendants nearly admitted as much by abandoning their standing arguments once Mr. W'mg 
was added as a plaintiff. 
Third, SSS argues that Elite Legacy Corporation does not have standing to sue because it 
was not a party to the FSBO and did not exist when the FSBO and REPC were signed. Elite 
Legacy Corporation and Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation are separate coq,orate entities that 
owned the dba ReMax Elite at different times. Both corporations have been plaintiffs in this 
action ever since the Third Amended Complaint was filed, and both entities were fonned by the 
same principal agent, Mr. Wing. The court sees no value in drawing a distinction between them 
at this time, when both entities are ultimately controlled by Mr. Wing, who is jointly liable. 
Fourth, SSS argues that Aspenwood Real Estate Coq,oration does not have standing to 
sue because it assigned its commission cause of action to Tim Shea. Although "ReMax" 
executed an Assignment containing language purporting to transfer "any and all claims, 
demands, and causes of action of any kind whatsoever which ReMax has or may have against 
Still Standing Stables, LLC," to Tim Shea, it is clear that the parties intended for ReMax to retain 
the right to pursue the commission claim. Specifically, the Assignment states, .. Tim's lawyer 
may represent Tim's interests and act as co-counsel for ReMax in pursuing ReMax's offensive 
claim . ... " (emphasis added). Further, the Assignment contemplates that Tim Shea did not have 
the right to bring the commission cause of action, stating " ... the parties agree that it will be best 
if Tim prosecutes, collects, settles, compromises, and grants releases in ReMax's name •..• " 
Accordingly, the court interprets the Assignment as giving Tim Shea the right to collect the 
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benefits of the commission claim, minus the first $10,000, and the right to direct the prosecution 
of the claim, but ReMax retained the right to stand as the fonnal party asserting the cause of 
action. This interpretation is strengthened by the timing of the Assignment, September 2008, the 
same month that this court granted ReMax and Shea's first motion to amend but clarified that 
only the principal broker could assert the commission claim. Ruling Granting Motion for Leave 
to Amend, (September 2, 2008). 
Lastly, Defendants insist that Aspenwood and Elite Legacy do not have standing because 
they are defunct corporations, and are not "principal brokers." This is an exact replica of 
standing ·argwnents asserted years ago, which Defendants abandoned because Mr. Wing was 
added as a plaintiff. Defendants were wise to abandon this argument after Mr. Wing was added 
as a party, and they should not have resurrected it here. Because Mr. Wing is the principal of 
both corporations, and a party to this action, drawing a distinction between them is meaningless. 
The parties' requests for a hearing on these matters are denied; oral argument wiU not 
assist the court in deciding the issues herein addressed. 
Order & Judgment 
Accordingly, Defendant Chuck Schvaneveldt's Motion to Dismiss Commission Claims 
Based on Lack of Standing and Jurisdiction is denied. To the extent that Defendant Still 
Standing Stable's Motion to Clarify seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs' commission claim, it is denied. 
To the extent that the parties' seek clarification regarding who is a judgment creditor and who is 
a judgment debtor, the court finds and rules as follows: 
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ISTRICT C URT 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HILARY "SKIP WING, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STILL STANDING STABLE, L.C., et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING & ORDER ON MOTION TO 
DISMISS ALL REMAX ELITE 
COUNTERCLAIMS BASED ON 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Case No. 060906802 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
This matter is before the court on Defendants Still Standing Stable, L.C., and Chuck 
Schvaneveldt's Motion to Dismiss All Remwc Elite Counterclaims Based on Settlement 
Agreement. Pursuant to the following, Defendants' Motion is denied. 
Defendants' motion is based entirely on its new theory, based on new evidence, that a 
third party, Dale Quinlan, is the true owner of Plaintiffs' claim, and that Defendants have settled 
the matter with Quinlan. 
As discussed in this court's July 22, 2013 Ruling and Order on Motions to Clarify and 
Schvaneveldt's Motion to Dismiss Commission Claims Based on Lack of Standing and 
Jurisdiction, this court cannot consider new evidence from Defendants after a final judgment 
unless, pursuant to rule 60(b ), the motion is filed within three months after the judgment and due 
diligence could not have discovered the new evidence in time for a new trial under Rule 59(b). 
Here, judgment against Schvanveldt was entered in January 2013 and all of the claims against 
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Still Standing Stables have Jong been dismissed. Further, the January judgment was entered 
based on a jwy verdict entered in August 2012. Accordingly, this motion is untimely. 
Even if Defendants' motion was timely, Schvaneveldt has not provided any explanation 
for why this new evidence could not have been discovered in time for a Rule 59(b) motion. 
Another fatal flaw to consideration of this new evidence. 
Lastly, even if this motion were not time barred and Defendants did have some 
reasonable excuse why they could not discover this new evidence earlier, settling a claim that 
could be raised by a third party does not per se indicate that the plaintiffs in this case did not 
have standing to assert their claims. At best the new evidence would raise a material question of 
fact concerning proper ownership of the commission claim 
The court does not believe that oral argument on this matter will contribute anything to 
its understanding of the issues or the law. Accordingly, Defendants' request for a hearing is 
denied. 
ORDER 
Pursuant to the foregoing, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss All ReMax Elite 
Counterclaims Based on Settlement Agreement is denied. No further order pursuant to rule 7(f) 
is required. The court is satisfied that this case is closed. 
DATEDthis~dayof ~2013 
r,:,, 
....., 
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EXHIBIT E 
Excerpt from Ruling and Order on Defendants ' Rule 52(b) Motion 
(third ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence) 
This case was tried with a jury, and so the alternative under Rule 
59( a)( 4) that the Court is permitted to consider newly discovered evidence, 
provides that the party bringing the motion can only produce evidence that 
he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the 
trial. 
That is an issue which has been previously addressed, and this Court's 
ruling is not going to depart from the prior rulings. 
And that is, that the information specifically the documentation from 
the Department of Corporations, and the information contained in that 
documentation, also challenges with respect to the validity or invalidity of 
signatures, and whether or not they're forged or have been cut and pasted, 
all of those kinds of things were information that could, by reasonable 
diligence, have been discovered and determined well before a trial was 
conducted in this case. 
The record is abundantly clear that these are all public records. They 
have been available to all of the parties throughout these proceedings. 
There have been references to the dba registration during the trial. 
There is documentation in the record of the Department of Corporations 
showing registrations in the corporate names of Elite Legacy and Aspenwood 
Real Estate. Those are all part of the record in the public file, and they were 
4 
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all available, as well as records including the signature of Dale Quinlan, 
which would put anyone on notice of his potential interest in those dbas. 
And the Court speclfically rules that it is under Rule 59 that new 
evidence may be considered under appropriate circumstances. 
In this case, the Court's ruling is that the Rule 59 latitude for 
modification of findings and conclusions does not apply and is not available. 
And even if it were. available, would not be justified based upon this 
evidence, which the Court rules is new evidence, which could reasonably 
have been known prior to the trial being conducted. 
With respect to Rule 52, which is the specific focus of the motion, and 
the motion which the Court has determined to be timely, the Court's ruling is 
that there is no latitude under Rule 52 to consider new evidence. 
The policy underlying Rule 52 is to make sure that the findings and 
conclusions that are entered in the record are consistent with the record of 
the trial. And the opportunity to amend or correct, it is the Court's ruling, is 
an opportunity to ensure consistency with the. trial record, not deviate from 
the trial record based upon consideration of additional evidence which was 
not considered or presented at trial. 
Further, with respect to these particular issues, the Court notes that 
when a judgment and verdict are entered, particularly when there is a jury 
5 
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verdict entered, that any construction of the facts which may be considered 
by the Court requires the Court to construe the facts that are found, 
consistent with that judgment, and that if there are alternative constructions 
of the facts that are possible, from the facts as they are presented, the 
Court is required to construe those facts consistent with the judgment which 
was entered. 
And in this particular case, the Court's ruling with respect to the 
present motion is that, as has been demonstrated, there is evidence in the 
record of this trial, which is consistent with the determinations that were 
made.· 
There is evidence in the trial in this case, of the registration of the dba 
in the names Elite Legacy and Aspenwood Real Estate. And while there 
certainly is documentation with respect to Mr. Quinlan's interest in the dba, 
the record of the trial, by acknowledgment of movant's counsel is devoid of 
any reference at all to Mr. Quinlan. And perhaps on that basis alone, it 
would be inappropriate for this Court to suggest any modification of the 
finding, to burden those findings with additional information relating to Mr. 
Quinlan, when none of that information was presented at trial. 
Those issues would be issues that may justify a new trial under Rule 
59; however that motion is not before the Court today. 
6 
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EXHIBIT F 
Excerpt from Ruling and Order on Defendants ' Rule 60(b) Motion 
(fourth ru1ing refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence) 
made previous rulings on those issues, and those rulings are not going to be 
disturbed by the Court today. There is evidence that is even before the 
Court today, including the record of the Department of Corporations, that 
shows Legacy Elite as a registered owner of the dba during particular time 
periods. There is documentation that shows Aspenwood Real Estate, either 
as an LLC or as a corporation, as a registered owner of the dba at various 
time. There are documents which purport to assign the dba between those 
entities. There is a document, purportedly signed by Mr. Quinlan, that 
purports to transfer whatever interest he may have had, whether that was a 
bare legal title to the dba that was equitably owned by the corporation 
already, or whether it was something else. That kind of information is not 
before the Court. But to be consistent with the prior rulings, the Court's 
ruling today is that the evidence is sufficient to maintain all of the prior 
rulings of the Court with respect to the issues of standing and ownership of 
the dba, and those rulings will not be disturbed. The suggestion that all of 
the documentation now produced 1 and the arguments now being made, that 
Mr. Quinlan, in fact, has at an times been the real party in interest, and is 
the only party that has the right to proceed, are simply not persuasive. 
The Court•s observation of this case, from the review of the 
proceedings up to the point of trial and then during the post-trial process, is 
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that this issue of Mr. Quinlan's ownership of the dba, and his derivative right 
therefore to effectively control these claims or to transfer them, assign 
them, or compromise them, is a construct, all of which has occurred after 
trial. And it is a construct which is based, to a large extent, on a letter, 
December 11th, 2013, that the Court has previously made reference to, 
which appears to be a deviation from any recognized practice of the 
Department of Commerce. It presupposes findings with respect to issues of 
forgery, or cutting and pasting of documents. None of those issues have 
ever been presented on an evidentiary basis to the Court, and the Court, in 
light of both the timing of its presentation, the fact that Mr. Quinlan's 
involvement, both in the business entity and in the registration of the dba, is 
a matter of public record that has existed for many years, and questions that 
the Court has raised with respect to these documents, the Court will simply 
not countenance the legal argument that Mr. Quinlan is effectively the 
superseding entity with respect to these claims, and that argument is not 
given further legal consideration by the Court. 
Similarly, the argument with respect to the necessity that the Court 
determine that the judgment is void because of failure to comply with the 
requirements of mediation, while there have been sugge~tions that specific 
requirements of the mediation rules or statutes may not have technically 
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been complied with, there's been no indication that there was any objection 
made at the time, or that these issues were even raised until they have now 
come up, well after trial, well after the conclusion of that mediation. And 
again, based upon a construct to some extent which superimposes Mr. 
Quinlan's purported rights into that process, suggesting that the failure of 
his participation may also necessarily constitute a failure of the legal 
sufficiency of the mediation, the Court simply will not consider those 
arguments, based upon the analysis which has previously been made. And 
the record before the Court is that a mediation was ordered, and that a 
mediation was conducted. Whether there were technical deficiencies in that 
mediation, to this Court1s knowledge, they weren't ever brought to the 
Court's attention in a manner that would have permitted the Court to 
address deficiencies with respect to the mediation, or, at the time, that 
would have permitted the parties to also address those particular issues.· 
There has been nothing argued to the Court on those points, and the 
Court rules that the argument with respect to the insufficiency of the 
mediation is not persuasive; therefore, the Court's ruling is that the asserted 
grounds for relief under Rule 60{b)( 4), that the judgment itself is void, are 
not well taken. That objection to the form of the judgment is overruled, and 
the motion for relief denied. And I believe that is all of the issues that were 
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Ruling and Order on Defendants ' Rule 25(c) Motion 
(fifth and final ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence) 
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Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Still Standing Stables, L.C., et al. 
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Ruling and Order on November 24, 2014 Hearing of Defendants' Rule 25(c) Motion 
Civil No. 060906802 
Honorable Noel S. Hyde 
On November 24, 2014, the Honorable Noel S. Hyde held a hearing on Defendants' Rule 
25(c) Motion. Dallin T. Morrow of LeBaron & Jensen, P.C. appeared for the Plaintiffs; Robert J. 
Fuller appeared for Defendant Chuck Schvaneveldt and Still Standing Stables, L.C.; and Karra J. 
Porter appeared for Third-Party Defendant Cathy Code. 
Ruling 
Defendants' Rule 25(c) Motion raises an issue essentially identical to an issue that the 
Defendants have raised previously, i.e. the claim that Still Standing Stables, as the asserted current 
owner of the dba "Remax Elite," either by assignment from Dale Quinlan or by separate 
administrative determination by the Department of Corporations, owns the right to control the 
judgment in this case. In past hearings, the court has ruled that the evidence and arguments 
suppo1ting these assertions of Still Standing Stables were not timely brought in this case and are not 
now properly before the courl. 
December 29, 2014 01 :33 PM 2 of 5 
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The court declines to modify its earlier rulings. As a result, the court rules that Still Standing 
Stables' ownership or control of the judgment has not been established, and that the requested 
substitution under Rule 25(c) is not appropriate. 
Order 
Based upon the court's ruling, the court orders that Defendants' motion under Rule 25(c) is 
denied. 
------END OF ORDER-------
In accordance with the Utah State District Courts EfiJing Standard No. 4, and URCP Rule 
lO{e), this Order does not bear the handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an 
electronic signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this Order. 
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